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This Master's Thesis examines General Douglas MacArthur's strategic
assessments which led to his pursuit of the expansion of the Korean War beyond the Yalu
River. By examining General MacArthur's actions during the Korean War, I clarify the
reason behind his desire to expand the war into Manchuria and China. This evaluation
also provides insight into MacArthur's overall early Cold War strategy – 1949-1953. This
Master's Thesis challenges the notion that General MacArthur's desire to use atomic
weaponry in the expansion of the Korean War as being indicative of a flawed personality
or a lack of understanding of the geopolitical situation. Some viewed General MacArthur
as a warmonger, who purposefully sought to antagonize the Soviet Union into a general
war. In contrast, I postulate that MacArthur's Korean War strategy demonstrated his
intricate evaluation of the geopolitical situation of the early Cold War period.
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INTRODUCTION

The events of 1949 altered the Cold War strategy of the United States. The year
began with a key strategic victory by Chinese Communist Forces over Chinese
Nationalist Forces, resulting in the decimation of the Kuomintang (KMT) army, its forced
retreat south, and its eventual withdrawal to Formosa in October. This victory led to the
eventual declaration of the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that same
year. In March 1949, the Soviet Union successfully detonated their first atomic bomb,
effectively ending the U.S. atomic monopoly. The latter half of 1949 consisted of secret
meetings between Soviet and PRC leadership, which resulted in the solidification of the
expansion of the Communist bloc in the Far East with the signing of the Sino-Soviet
‘Mutual Assistance’ treaty, in February 1950.1 Following this alliance, North Korea
invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950.

President Harry Truman and his administration perceived these events as very
threatening not only to Western Europe, but also to United States preponderance
worldwide. Leading officials, notably the writers of NSC-68, viewed the Soviet Union as
expansionists, extremely aggressive and intent on spreading communism throughout
Western Europe and in Asia, even at the risk of open war with the United States.
Confirmation of this perception presented itself in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK) attack on South Korea and later by Soviet support of Chinese intervention
in the war.2
1

Until the Soviet Union’s detonation of an atomic bomb in 1949, the Truman
Administration believed it could deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe with its atomic
monopoly. Up until 1949, U.S. strategy assumed that if the Soviet Union did attack the
west, the Soviets would probably occupy most of Europe in the early stages of the war.
The United States would probably ultimately prevail in the conflict, however, because it
could mobilize superior economic resources against the Soviet Union and use its atomic
bombs to destroy the Soviets’ military and economic assets. As Soviet capabilities
became degraded, the United States would re-invade the continent and win the war. The
Soviet Union’s new atomic capability, however, made it unlikely this plan would work,
since the Soviet Union could now attack the United States economy and bomb any
invading force in Europe. 3

Faced with this new Soviet development the Truman Administration shifted its
strategic containment policy to ‘forward defense.’4 The reason being that if war came
against the Soviet Union, the United States had to be prepared to deliver punishing and
decisive blow at the start of the war, to destroy Soviet atomic and conventional forces, or
face the reality of the devastation and possible defeat of the United States at the hands of
the Soviet Union. In April 1950 the National Security Council drew up NSC-68, which
outlined this new strategy. It called for a massive military buildup, which would take
several years to complete. Upon completion of this military build-up, U.S. officials
believed the United States would have the forces to prevail in a war with the Soviet
Union and, armed with that confidence, they envisioned at that point implementing an
assertive diplomatic strategy “to check and to roll back the Kremlin’s drive for world
domination.”5
2

Meanwhile, as the Truman Administration sought to aggressively challenge the
Soviet Union’s expansion in Europe, their position on Asia was held with less fervor.
There, the Truman Administration identified Japan as being of the upmost importance to
U.S. security. U.S. officials determined that the ‘loss’ of China, although damaging to the
position of the United States, was not fatal. While they recognized China as being
important to the reconstruction of Japan, the Administration maintained that the resources
of Southeast Asia would provide Japan all it required. Far Eastern affairs did not chiefly
concern the Administration until the DPRK invaded South Korea, on June 25, 1950,
thereby damaging the credibility of containment.6

To bolster the credibility of containment as it pursued its military build-up, the
Truman Administration intervened in the Korean War to defend South Korea and
repositioned the U.S. Seventh Fleet to protect the KMT on Formosa. The Administration
strategically managed U.S. intervention in the Korean War to prevent expansion of the
conflict into global warfare against the Soviet Union and the PRC. This limited warfare
mindset reflected the Administration’s belief that it was unwise for the United States to
take aggressive actions that risked general war until it completed its military buildup, as
outlined in NSC-68. Following the successful landing at Inchon and counter attack
against the DPRK, the Administration fully supported pursuing the DPRK until its
destruction, but only because U.S. leaders did not believe the PRC would intervene in the
conflict. When the PRC did intervene, the Truman Administration became risk averse,
choosing instead to wage a limited war confined to the Korean peninsula.7

3

These views, however, were not shared by the Commander and Chief of the Far
East and Commander of all United Nations Forces General Douglas MacArthur. The
General persistently called for taking an aggressive approach to combat Chinese
Communist Forces fighting in Korea. These disagreements eventually led to the dismissal
of General MacArthur from command, on April 11, 1951, by Truman. Why did
MacArthur want to risk an expanded war with China in 1950? How did this willingness
to risk an expanded war relate to his overall strategic views in 1950? How did his
strategic views differ from the Truman Administration’s?

When embarking on an attempt to understand MacArthur’s complicated strategic
world view in the years 1949-1953, one must first understand his career and the political
nature of the man. MacArthur was born in 1880 to Captain Arthur MacArthur, Jr. (who
was a Medal of Honor recipient during the American Civil War) and his wife Mary
Pinkney Hardy MacArthur. In 1903, MacArthur graduated from West Point at the top of
his class. As a newly commissioned officer, his first duty station assignment came as a
member of the 3rd Engineer Battalion – which shortly after his arrival deployed to the
Philippines. Two years later he received orders to report to a new assignment in Tokyo.
When World War I broke out MacArthur was promoted to Major where he served as the
head of the Bureau of Information for the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker. Upon the
United States entrance into the war, MacArthur received new orders assigning him as
Chief of Staff of the 42nd Division, deploying him to France. In 1919, MacArthur became
Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Three years later MacArthur
received orders to return to the Philippines. Following his promotion to Major General in
1925, MacArthur received orders which stationed him stateside for the next 4 years until
4

reassignment sent him back to the Philippines in 1929. The following year, MacArthur
was sworn in as Chief of Staff of the United States Army with the rank of General. In
1935, MacArthur drew a new assignment sending him back to the Philippines charged
with the task of supervising the creation of the Philippine Army. There he would retire
from the Army at the end of 1937, remaining as a civilian adviser to the Philippine
government. The eruption of World War II in 1941 resulted in the federalization of the
Philippine Army and MacArthur being recalled to active duty, named Commander of
U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, and promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General. The
surrender of Japan brought a new assignment for MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the
Far East. During his reign as Commander in Chief of the Far East, he considered running
for the presidency of the United States of America. This can be seen in the fact that
although he openly expressed to Eisenhower that he had no such desire, he still allowed
his name to be put on the ballot for the 1948 Republican Primary. Even after his
controversial “retirement” he toured the United States giving public speeches, putting
himself out there politically for the 1952 Republican Primary. This basic fact of
MacArthur’s political ambition makes the understanding of his outlook on the early Cold
War all the more significant to historians of this period.8

Literature that addresses Douglas MacArthur falls into two polar opposite camps
when discussing his legacy and the makeup of the man. The first group consists of a very
small minority comprised mostly of men who served underneath his military command
for numerous years. Their aim is not to understand MacArthur’s strategic mindset but
simply rehabilitate and reinforce the heroic image of General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur, who was a West Point honor graduate and a Medal of Honor recipient and
5

who – as a ‘masterful’ strategist – helped lead the rollback of Japanese conquest of the
Pacific in World War II. They do not make an attempt analyze MacArthur’s strategic
views. They instead emphasize his leadership as being integral to shaping the emergence
of a peaceful Japan as “an engine of world economic growth and stability.”9 One ardent
defender of the General was his former aide Major General Courtney Whitney. In 1955,
he wrote a biography of General MacArthur entitled, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with
History. In the final paragraph of the book, Whitney claims that a clever conspiracy,
rooted in communist influence throughout Washington, led to the rejection of General
MacArthur’s strategic plan of the global war on communism.10

The other camp of scholars, such as historian Burton Kaufman, also pay little
attention to MacArthur’s strategic views. Instead scholarship here criticizes General
MacArthur’s judgment ascribing his views or decisions to a severe flaw in his
personality. To them, General MacArthur was an egotistical and self-centered man who
was continuously working toward his own glory and political goals.11 Burton Kaufman,
explains this theory of him “as a military leader obsessed with his own sense of destiny
and by a reckless disregard for higher authority.”12 These scholars echo the thoughts
Truman wrote in his diary in which he describes MacArthur as “Mr. Prima Donna” who
told God what to do.13

Rosemary Foot and Peter Lowe provide good examples of this critical scholarship
of General MacArthur. Foot’s work, The Wrong War, does not attempt to provide a direct
analysis of MacArthur’s strategic motivations. Instead she portrays him as a grand
manipulator and coercive force within the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization
6

(NATO), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Truman Administration whom Truman
and his Eurocentric cohorts combated daily. She portrays him as an overzealous United
States General who believed his military to be the world’s most superior.14 Foot further
expounds upon this idea by explaining that General MacArthur possessed a “cavalier
attitude” toward the potential bombing of China.15 To emphasize her point she provides
an excerpt from General Matthew Ridgway’s memoir, The Korean War, where he revisits
a meeting he had in August of 1950 in which General MacArthur expressed the opinion
that Chinese intervention was unlikely, but he added, “I pray nightly that they will –
would get down on my knees in order to have an opportunity to fight the Chinese
Communists.”16

Peter Lowe’s interpretation of General MacArthur is similar to Foot’s. He not
only emphasizes General MacArthur’s selfish motivations he also explained, through an
examination of General MacArthur’s Senate Hearing testimony, how the General viewed
American forces as far superior to that of Communist China and Russia. Lowe writes,
“He was to a large extent an independent operator because of the extraordinary nature of
his long career, because of his personality, and because of his remaining [political]
ambitions. He diverged from the Truman Administration chiefly in the extent of his
obsession with ‘Red’ China; he was not particularly interested in the Soviet Union and
was far more moderate towards Moscow than might have been expected.”17

What is lacking in the works by Peter Lowe and Foot is an exact analysis of why
General MacArthur held such a strategic opinion of North Korea, China, and the Soviet
Union. They simply dismiss MacArthur’s assessments as “imaginative”.18 The
7

scholarship of these authors does not explain MacArthur’s strategic outlook, they focus
much more on blanket characterizations of his actions as flaws in personality – i.e.
obsession with ‘Red China’, a megalomaniac, and ‘imaginative’.

In contrast to the Truman Administration, General MacArthur wanted to pursue
an aggressive “rollback” strategy in fighting the Cold War in 1950. In his view, the
Korean War provided western powers the opportunity to regain control of Asia by reunifying Korea. The intervention of the People’s Republic of China in conflict, likewise,
provided the United States the opportunity to decisively alter the Chinese Civil War
through U.S. military action and through the “unleashing” the Kuomintang in both
mainland China and Korea. MacArthur believed that the PRC’s control over China was a
temporary one, which could easily be toppled with U.S. military support. Soviet
intervention in a United States – PRC war was of no real risk in either Asia or in Europe,
according to MacArthur, because of what he viewed as Soviet military weaknesses and
the Soviet leadership’s risk-averse nature. The opportunity was now, before the Soviet
Union developed its atomic arsenal and delivery capabilities. Seizing the opportunity in
Asia would amount to a decisive victory in the Cold War for the United States and its
Western Allies.

8

CHAPTER I
THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF ASIA

The strategic epicenter of Cold War foreign policy differed between the Truman
Administration and General MacArthur. The Administration believed Western Europe to
be the key to the balance of Cold War power.19 To MacArthur, the idea that the Cold War
would be won or lost in Europe was an incorrect assessment of the current geopolitical
situation. He contended that United States needed to actively participate in the rebuilding
and restructuring of nations throughout the Far East. Although they differed upon which
Cold War theater held more significance, both the Truman Administration and General
MacArthur ardently believed in the containment strategy – seeking to “check the
expansion of Soviet influence” in the Far East.20 They both regarded Japan as the most
significant territory in the Far East, not only to the interest of the United States but the
world’s security.21 Furthermore, MacArthur also shared in the belief that if the Soviet
Union was permitted to co-opt the resources and raw materials either in Western Europe
(as the Germans did), or in the Far East (as the Japanese did), then they would have the
opportunity to significantly increase the size and strength of their military – making them
a most formidable foe.22

MacArthur perceived the Soviet Union’s aggressive expansion in the Far East as
motivated by their desire to achieve two basic goals, 1) valuable raw materials and 2)
fresh water access. MacArthur insisted that these goals had been historically well
9

documented. He explained in his memoir that his father, Arthur MacArthur, experienced
firsthand the Soviet Union’s attempt during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), to
expand its territory and achieve these goals.23

These goals were first scripted in a 1947 memo when MacArthur sent a message
to the Secretary of State, George Marshall, in which he outlined the strategy of the Soviet
Union in North Korea. In this message he explained that the Soviet Union had not altered
its goal of retaining North Korea as a loyal satellite state “to insure Soviet use of Wonsan
and Chinnampo [as] Soviet ports.”24 MacArthur argued that the Soviet Union’s strategic
goal in the Far East, the reason that they got involved in the Pacific Theater in the final
months of World War II, resided in its habitual desire for warm water access. General
MacArthur further explicated upon the historical nature of this desire during his
congressional testimony. He stated that the Russian desire for coastal access existed
because they had “always believed that [they] could not take [their] rightful place in the
international sphere of commerce and industry unless [they] shared the commerce of the
seas. For centuries [Russia] has been seeking warm waters.”25 Such access in the warm
waters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans would allow “her a chance to develop
transportation [and] her water transportation facilities.”26 The access these oceans would
provide for the Soviet Union would result in an outflanking of the Mediterranean, “but it
would place her fair and flush upon the continent of Africa, which for the next hundred
years, with its enormous industrial potential is something that attracts all commerce and
all industry, whatever its nationality might be.”27
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As mentioned earlier, the two most important locations, as designated by the
Truman Administration and endorsed by MacArthur, were Germany and Japan. These
two nations were proclaimed to be the powerful epicenters that were the keys of their
respective geographical locations. Under this assessment, U.S. leaders believed that if
either of these two nations were co-opted into the Soviet sphere, the Soviet Union would
have access to invaluable resources of men and material. This meant that the Soviet
Union would be able to mobilize the available labor force of either nation, which would
undoubtedly provide the Soviet Union the capability to drastically enhance their military
manufacturing output as well as their gathering of resources. The result of this would
provide the Soviet Union the ability to drastically build up its military force and enhance
its military capabilities. The Truman Administration and General MacArthur believed
that this co-option should be prevented at all costs or the United States, along with the
rest of the world, would find itself at the mercy of the Soviet Union’s expansion.

Japan’s significance to the security of the United States, thus the world, can be
found in a report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 9, 1949. The sentiment found in this
report was fully supported by MacArthur and the Truman Administration. The JCS report
expanded upon the geopolitical implication of Japan, explaining that if the Soviet Union
absorbed Japan into its orbit; “Japan, also because of her geographic location, could
under [U.S.S.R.] control be used as a base for aggressive action directly against United
States bases in the Western Pacific, in anticipation of step-by-step advances eastward and
to the Southeast Asia region. … Japan’s strategic importance is increased by her
manpower and her industrial potentials. … Despite the logistic demand that would need
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to be met in making her support useful… these… potentials could… have great influence
either for or against the interests of the United States in event of global war.”28

While these basic goals were the motivating factors behind the Soviet Union’s
intervention in World War II, their larger goal sought to secure a voice in the rebuilding
of Japan so that they might expand their periphery in the Far East with the eventual
solidification of their Eastern Front.29 MacArthur explained, “What the Soviets sought
were the economic frontiers of the world, Asia to the north, Africa to the south – frontiers
which possessed a mighty reservoir of the world’s potential wealth in raw resources. The
center represented little in the economic advance, the flanks everything.”30 Achievement
of either flank would result in the eventual solidification of the other; MacArthur argued
that if the Soviet Union achieved its current expansion eastward, solidifying their desired
Eastern Front, then soon they would be able to expand their Western Front all the more
aggressively.31

The successful co-option of Japan and solidification of the Soviet Union’s Eastern
Flank resided in their successful influence in China. This understanding led MacArthur to
believe, more so than the Truman Administration, that China was a key power center in
Asia and its loss to communism was a major threat to the security of the United States
and the world. If the Soviet Union was allowed to solidify its position in the Far East
there was no telling the opportunities or the capabilities that would be offered for the
nation.

General MacArthur’s overall opinion on the significance of China and its role in
determining the allegiances of the Asiatic region cannot be found in any direct quote or
12

statement. Instead, it can be gleaned from the multiple recommendations and memos
directed at the Truman Administration, Republican Senators, and the Veterans of Foreign
Wars (VFW). Most of these recommendations centered upon the strategic importance of
the United States solidifying its geopolitical preponderance of power throughout the
entire Pacific Basin. MacArthur speculated that if communists were allowed to remain in
power in China that it would drastically damage the preponderance of the United States
in that region, while providing the Soviet Union the opportunity to solidify and expand its
influence.

Prior to 1949, when it came to assessing the potential outcome of a World War
between the Soviet Union and Western powers, General MacArthur believed – as did the
Truman Administration – that the Soviet Union would be defeated. However, unlike the
Truman Administration, MacArthur based his notion less upon the American atomic
monopoly and more upon his assessment that the capabilities of the Soviet Union were
severely hindered by its two front vulnerability, so long as China remained tied to the
west. The “loss” of China to the Communists and the signing of the Sino-Soviet Alliance
in 1950 was thus a major setback for the United States in MacArthur’s view.

General MacArthur elaborated on this idea in his speech to Congress on April 19,
1951 in Washington D.C. “The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the
problems of one sector, oblivious to those of another, is but to court disaster for the
whole,” the General asserted. “While Asia is commonly referred to as the gateway to
Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of
the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other.” 32 The United States and her allies
13

could not afford to allow the Soviet Union the opportunity to expand in either front. For
this reason he argued that “if a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is
for us to counter his effort.” 33 Here MacArthur stressed the significance of the United
States to maintain a balanced military in both Europe and Asia in hopes to deter the
Soviet Union from continuing its expansion eastward. General MacArthur addressed this
issue in a meeting with William J. Sebald (acting U.S. Political Adviser for Japan) and
Max W. Bishop. The General expressed concern, to Bishop and Sebald, that the
Administration was granting the security of the Far East and the Pacific “far too little
consideration” by transferring naval power to the Atlantic, along with the reducing the
U.S. airpower in the Pacific.34 MacArthur believed the situation in the Far East to be
unstable and that the removal of vital assets necessary to the security of the Far East was
detrimental not only to the present situation but also to Global Security. “The Communist
threat is a global one,” he stressed. “Its successful advance in one sector threatens the
destruction of every sector. You cannot appease or otherwise surrender to Communism in
Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe.” 35

More specifically, the first reason the ‘loss’ of China was detrimental was
because a China within the Soviet Union’s orbit provided it with a strategically key
bulwark capable of defending its Far Eastern shores from any aggressive military
campaign emanating from Japan, Okinawa or any other part of the Far East by the hand
of western powers. This would allow the Soviet Union to eliminate a key strategic flaw in
its natural location, namely its vulnerability on its western front in Europe and its eastern
front in Asia. This expanded front would also enhance the Soviet Union’s overall military
and industrial capabilities. In agreement with Admiral Cooke, MacArthur insisted that if,
14

“Soviet eastern Asia becomes self-sufficient …, Soviet Asia can then become an element
of strength in the over-all Soviet power structure…. If it is extended to include Korea and
broadened to include Manchuria and possibly Hopei and Shantung, it appears probable
that the … balance of power has been moved from the side of the democratic powers to
that of Soviet Russia and her satellites.”36

That was precisely what MacArthur contended a ‘friendly’ China afforded the
Soviet Union. No longer would the Soviet Union be forced to divide its forces for the
security of its borders in both Western Europe and East Asia. The Sino-Soviet Alliance
now provided the Soviets military flexibility by strengthening their Far Eastern position
without utilizing their own military power. De Facto political control of China provided
the Soviet Union with a newly expanded front in the Far East; stretching from the eastern
edge of Siberia on the Sea of Japan, along the 38th Parallel in North Korea, down to the
South China Sea, just north of Vietnam. The Soviet Union had now multiplied its reach
without stretching the limits of its military force – the only major military presence in
these newly allied countries was in the form of military advisers to assist in military
planning and training of national military forces.

To MacArthur, the method by which this regional acquisition was achieved was
almost as significant as the military flexibility afforded by this new bulwark. The
acquisition, made without military force, saved the Soviet Union from expending its
limited military resources or its natural resources. MacArthur noted that the, “Russian
policy is not to sacrifice its own troops, but to use those of its friends. The enormous
expansion of Soviet influence since the end of the World War II has been brought about
15

without the Russian soldier firing a shot in battle.”37 This allowed the Soviets to maintain
a strategic balance necessary to maintain their strength in the global community without
risking open war and continuing to meet their desired reconstruction and expansion goals.

The gains made through the Sino-Soviet Alliance provided the Soviet Union with
access to invaluable strategic resources that it had long desired in the Far East. China
provided them the expanded opportunity for warm water access, which MacArthur
argued, had been an ultimate goal of the Soviet Union since the late 1800s, as seen in the
Russo-Japanese War and Soviet involvement in Korea following World War II.
MacArthur wrote in his memoir that this new strategic affordability provided the Soviet
Union with an atmosphere conducive to exploitation of natural resources throughout not
only of Asia, but the possibility of expansion into Africa.38 These acquisitions, through an
alliance with China, provided the Soviet Union with invaluable resources necessary for
expediting its reconstruction, thereby its expansion.

Secondly, the ‘loss’ of China, and the method by which it was lost, created to
MacArthur an environment which might lead to a domino effect throughout Asia. He
argued that the nations of Asia would drift one by one from western influence to that of
the Soviet Union. MacArthur founded this theory upon the belief that the alliance of Far
Eastern nations with the West was tenuous. MacArthur explained that if Asian allies did
not receive actual help from the United States, or the United Nations, that “they very
probably will make the best bargain they can with the other side so that they can escape
the depredations and destructiveness of being overrun.”39 This is not the only example of
MacArthur explaining the psychology of the ‘oriental mind’. In a composed
16

memorandum in June 1950 he implored that the Truman Administration maintain a sense
of urgency when dealing with other nations throughout Asia in the wake of the ‘loss of
China’: “This is our most impelling need of the moment in this quarter of the globe – the
regaining of our lost initiative over the events which are stirring all of the Asian peoples.
For, it is in the pattern of Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute
and dynamic leadership but quickly turn from a leadership characterized by timidity or
vacillation.”40 Thus, these rebuilding nations sought alliances only with the most
powerful nations. This meant that the successful expansion of the Soviet Union’s
preponderance in the Far East was directly tied to the decrease of that of the United
States. The Soviet Union’s successful gains in China might lead Japan and other states to
shift to the Soviet Union’s side, which might allow the Soviets to co-opt Far Eastern
resources, perhaps through bilateral trade agreements as they had done in Eastern Europe.
The result would be a major shift in the balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union.

Solidification of the Soviet Union’s Eastern Front along with the co-option of
resources available would have a paramount influence upon the Soviet Union’s effort,
desire, and method of expansion into Western Europe. MacArthur fervently believed that
the security of Western Europe was tied directly to the allegiances and security of the Far
East. He stated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 23, 1950, the importance of the
Inchon landing and the moment that was at hand, “It is plainly apparent that here in Asia
is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global
conquest…. We here fight Europe’s war with arms, while there it is still confined to
words. If we lose the war to Communism in Asia, the fate of Europe will be gravely
jeopardized. Win it and Europe will probably be saved from war and stay free.”41
17

MacArthur reaffirmed this message to the JCS writing on December 30, 1950. “I
understand thoroughly the demand for European security and fully concur in doing
everything possible in that sector, but not to the point of accepting defeat anywhere else
and acceptance which I am sure could not fail to ensure later defeat in Europe itself.”42
Again this belief can be found in a letter from MacArthur to Republican Congressman
Joe Martin, dated March 20th 1951, “… if we lose the war to Communism in Asia the fall
of Europe is inevitable; win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet
preserve freedom. … There is no substitute for victory.”43 Here we see that MacArthur
believed the security of Europe was tied to the security of Asia, and the linchpin in Asia
was China.

Thirdly, and most often noted, General MacArthur emphasized the security risk
that a Communist China posed to not only the geopolitical preponderance of the United
States’ power in Europe and Asia, but also to the defensive perimeter of the mainland of
the United States. MacArthur identified Formosa as one of the most significant strategic
parcels of land – outside of Japan – that held the key to the preponderance of United
States power in the Far East and the Pacific. The General believed that the Chinese
Communist victory in mainland China meant that Formosa would soon too fall to the
Chinese Communists. In early 1949, for example, he contended that the ‘next logical
‘domino’ to fall to the Communists would be Formosa, which would be detrimental to
the United States security and position in the Far East. “If Formosa went to the Chinese
Communists,” he argued to Administration officials William Sebald and Max Bishop,
“our whole defensive position in the Far East was definitely lost; that it could only result
eventually in putting our defensive line back to the west coast of the continental United
18

States.”44 MacArthur added “that there could be no question but that if Formosa were in
the hands of the Chinese Communists it would be available to the [U.S.S.R.] as a base at
any time the latter desired.”45

MacArthur had been concerned about East Asia and the United States defensive
perimeter for some time. Following the surrender of Japan in 1945, the Truman
Administration and MacArthur both saw the need to expand the defensive perimeter of
the United States in the Pacific. In 1948, in the wake of the military success of Chinese
Communists against Chinese Nationalists forces, the strategic significance and security of
Japan came to the forefront of political discussion. This resulted in further strategic
discussions between MacArthur and State Department officials in Japan on March 1,
1948, to be followed by the JCS’s construction of a memorandum evaluating Japan mid1949. Out of these discussions came the defensive perimeter made up of island chains,
which Japan was a part of.

On March 1, in Japan during a luncheon with George Kennan, MacArthur
explained to those present the strategic significance of Japan to the U.S. defense
perimeter. The “strategic boundaries of the United States were no longer along the
western shores of the North and South America,” he stated; “they lay along the eastern
shores of the Asiatic continent.” He continued, “Our fundamental strategic task was to
make sure that no serious amphibious force could ever be assembled and dispatched from
an Asiatic port. … The center of our defense problem [has] now sifted to the north, since
it was now only toward the north that a threat of the development of amphibious power
could mature.”46 Based on the current power dynamic in the Far East, MacArthur
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outlined his defensive perimeter that was designed to solidify United States interests
throughout the Pacific and in the Far East. MacArthur explained that this defensive
perimeter, “was a U-shaped area embracing the Aleutian [Islands], Midway, the Former
Japanese mandated islands …the Philippines, and above all Okinawa.”47

To General MacArthur, the defensive perimeter, along the islands falling within
its scope, provided the United States and the United Nations an optimal position to not
only defend itself but to stage a devastating strike force against their enemies.48 Okinawa,
for its strategic potential, was designated as the most significant island within this point
for two reasons. First, its location, size, and established air strips which provided the
United States a location to maintain her interests in the region. This meant that with the
United States Air Force the United States could control the “Asiatic coast from
Vladivostok to Singapore,” to include “the ports of northern Asia from which an
amphibious operation could conceivably be launched.”49 Beyond preventing amphibious
assaults from the north, Okinawa also provided the United States the ability to retain
complete control over “the Ryukyu [island] chain south of Latitude 29.”50

One year later in March 1949, in a press interview, MacArthur publicly stated for
the first time America’s Pacific defensive perimeter: “Now the Pacific has become an
Anglo-Saxon lake and our line of defense runs through the chain of islands fringing the
coast of Asia. It starts from the Philippines and continues through the Ryukyu
Archipelago which includes its broad main bastion, Okinawa. Then it bends back through
Japan and the Aleutian Island chain to Alaska.”51 It is important to note here the absence
of Formosa, even though General MacArthur emphasized the importance of Formosa in
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that meeting with Bishop and Sebald less than one month earlier on February 3, 1949.
The General’s reasoning for this omission can be based upon the understanding that the
Kuomintang (KMT) had only lost a major battle and control of northern China. However,
they still maintained control of southern China, and the Chinese Communists had yet to
even cross the Yangtze River. Furthermore, the KMT continued to receive military
supplies from the United States. Their complete defeat and subsequent evacuation to
Formosa was not yet solidified.

Once the Chinese Communists forced the retreat of the KMT to Formosa, on
December 10, 1949, MacArthur clarified his position to include Formosa within the
defensive perimeter. The “threat of the development of amphibious power” had now
returned in both the north and south of Asia.52 The United States’ security in the Pacific
was now severely threatened. In the mind of MacArthur the ‘loss’ of Formosa was all but
guaranteed and this fact severely threatened the longevity of the United States ability to
control this “bastion”, thus their preponderance of power in the Pacific would crumble
and the mainland of the United States would be threatened.53

On June 14, 1950 – eleven days before the start of the Korean War – MacArthur
detailed for Washington an eleven point memorandum in which he explained in great
detail the strategic value of Formosa, not only in the Far East, but also to United States
national security.54 He contended that “it is obvious that the time must come in the
foreseeable future when a line must be drawn beyond which Communist expansion will
be stopped. As a means of regaining a proper United States posture in the Orient it is
apparent to me that the United States should initiate measures to prevent the domination
21

of Formosa by a Communist power. I am equally certain that it would be a fundamental
error with regard to any part of the orient to fail to take appropriate measures in those
areas still open to our influence.” He continued, “Formosa is an integral part of [our
defensive perimeter] which in the event of hostilities can exercise a decisive degree of
control of military operations along the periphery of Eastern Asia. … The United States
striking forces based on this line would have the capability to interdict the limited means
of communication available to the Communists and deny or materially reduce the ability
of the [U.S.S.R.] to exploit the natural resources of East and Southeast Asia.”55
MacArthur concluded his point by exclaiming that these capabilities hinged upon the
United States “dependence upon the retention of Formosa by a friendly or a neutral
power.”56 Therefore, “the domination of Formosa by an unfriendly power would be a
disaster of utmost importance to the United States, and I am convinced that time is of the
essence. I strongly believe that the Commander-in-Chief Far East should be authorized
and directed to initiate without delay a survey of the military, economic and political
requirements to prevent the domination of Formosa by a Communist power and that the
results of such a survey be analyzed and acted upon as a basis for United States national
policy with respect to Formosa.”57

General MacArthur further emphasized the strategic significance of Formosa in
his letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) of Chicago, dated August 27, 1950
(This letter was written following his personal inspection of Formosa on August 1, 1950).
In it he emphasized that Formosa, positioned at the very center of the United States’
position in Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines would provide a foothold in the United
States defensive perimeter if it got in the hands of a powerful unfriendly nation to the
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United States. He explained, “At the present time there is on Formosa a concentration of
operational air and naval bases which is potentially greater that any similar concentration
on the Asiatic mainland between the Yellow Sea and the Strait of Malacca.”58
Furthermore, MacArthur described the ease at which the development of additional
military facilities could be achieved through the exploitation of present World War II
Japanese facilities already located on the island.59 At that present moment MacArthur
assessed that Formosa itself had the capacity to stage “ten to twenty air groups of types
ranging from jet fighters to B-29-type bombers, as well as to provide forward operating
facilities for submarines.”60

The capability of the enemy’s staged military assets on Formosa was of
paramount danger to the United States because they were “100 miles closer to Okinawa
than any point on the Chinese mainland and are 150 miles closer to Clark Field and
Manila [both located in the Philippines] than any other area which could be acquired by
Communist military forces.”61 This would allow enemy forces to increase their air effort
100 percent against United States airfields, located in such areas as Okinawa. Western
shipping lanes would also become the predatorial waters of enemy submarines.
MacArthur emphasized that the geographical make-up of Formosa would provide enemy
forces not only an ideal location to stage offensive operations but also provide them with
the capability to “checkmate” defensive or counter-offensive operations by American and
allied forces.62 General Macarthur emphasized that any hostile nation that controlled
Formosa would be afforded the position to “either counterbalance or overshadow the
strategic importance of the central and southern flank of the United States front line
position.”63 He continued to expound, “Formosa in the hands of the Communists can be
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compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender ideally located to
accomplish Soviet offensive strategy and at the same time checkmate counteroffensive
operations by United States Forces based on Okinawa and the Philippines.“64

The term ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ was one that MacArthur often used to
describe Formosa. One reason for his constant usage of that term would have been to
emphasize and remind Washington officials of his prior assessment of the weakness of
the Soviet Union, one key being their lack of navy. The significance of this Soviet
deficiency resided in the assessment that under current conditions any attempt by an
Asian power to attack the United States or its allies must be amphibious, and thus it
would be doomed to failure without control of the sea or air.65 However, MacArthur
explained, Communist control of Formosa would provide the Soviet Union the
opportunity to utilize this unsinkable aircraft carrier to supplement their lacking navy.
Therefore, the Soviet Union would now be provided the capability to advance its position
in the Pacific Ocean without maintaining a naval force other than her submarines. The
island would inherently enhance the Soviet navy providing it with the ability to act as a
forward operating base for her naval and air strengths. Staged out of Formosa the Soviet
Union would be capable of causing serious damage to United States shipping lanes and
interests. Furthermore, MacArthur assessed, that Communist seizure of Formosa would
mean that “Russia will have acquired an additional “fleet” which will have been obtained
and can be maintained at an incomparably lower cost to the Soviets than could its
equivalent of ten or twenty aircraft carriers with their supporting forces.”66
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To supplement his emphasis on their strategic vulnerability MacArthur focused
upon the historical use of Formosa as a springboard for military aggression against its
southern neighbors. He emphasized that the Japanese used the island as a staging area
and a supporting base of their Pacific operations in 1941. Formosa was the vital linchpin
in the transportation and communication from Japan throughout the South Pacific. As
Allied Forces pushed back the Japanese it became even more vital to their defensive
perimeter. Permitting enemy forces to acquire such strategically geographical pertinent
lands, such as Korea or Formosa, could alter regional strength and history could repeat
itself. “Its military potential would again be fully exploited as the means to breach and
neutralize our Western Pacific defense system and mount a war of conquest against the
free nations of the Pacific Basin.”67 MacArthur expounded upon this in his testimony to
Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, “If the enemy secured Formosa and secured thereby the
Pacific Ocean that would immeasurably increase the dangers of that ocean being used as
an avenue of advance by any potential enemy. And Alaska is on that ocean; it would
unquestionably increase the dangers to Alaska as well as it would be to the State of
California, the State of Washington, and Oregon, Central and South America.”68

The strategic threat went beyond the offensive and defensive posture that
Formosa offered. Following the ‘loss’ of China, General MacArthur believed that the
resources necessary for rebuilding Japan were of the upmost importance, and in Formosa
he noted the available agriculture as being significant to the Japanese. Since 1910
Formosa has been able to consistently exporting its food surplus. Prior to the beginning
of World War II in Asia, Formosa had been exporting on an annual basis rice and wheat
to the approximation of 600,000 metric tons. The implications of these exported goods to
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Japan only enhanced her wartime capabilities. MacArthur contended that such numbers
could be replicated in a short time and would play a vital role in the rebuilding of Japan.
He explained, “the availability of food surplus, may be of considerable importance in
reestablishing the economies of those Oriental nations now largely dependent upon
United States assistance.” However, if they allowed Formosa to be swallowed by
Communists then these surpluses would not only aid the Communist war effort – if a war
began – but also assist in the expansion of communism. The latter would be the case due
to the fact that much of the Far East had been utterly destroyed by the Japanese and
famine had become prevalent throughout the East and Southeast Asia. Thus, these
starving nations would be persuaded by the supplies in which the Soviet Union could
now offer them, expanding the Soviet orbit.69

To General MacArthur the repercussions of the ‘loss’ of China were not to be
simply dismissed, for the effects would resonate globally. MacArthur believed that
strategic resources necessary to the rebuilding of Japan were severely damaged by this
‘loss’. Furthermore, the PRC’s alliance with the Soviet Union provided them a fortified
eastern flank that encouraged an economic and military relationship with the Soviet
Union instead of the Imperialist West.70 This domino effect would result in strategically
threatening the United States’ position in the Pacific. The Communist seizure of China
would eventually have an irreversible effect upon the control of Formosa and eventually
Japan, thus the United States would face being expelled from the entire Pacific Basin. If
Formosa was allowed to fall under the control of the PRC, it would eventually result in
the shattering of the free peoples of the Pacific Basin: “In view of the moral implications,
as well as the geographic proximity of this area to other endangered peoples on and near
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the periphery of China, the future status of Formosa can well be an important factor in
determining the political alignment of those national groups who have or must soon make
a choice between Communism and the West.”71 Nothing could be more disastrous than if
the United States were to let that happen – if Asia was lost then Europe would soon
follow. General MacArthur summarized his feelings on the significance of the ‘loss’ of
China to Senator Alexander Wiley before the Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. MacArthur said, “It is my own
personal opinion that the greatest political mistake we made in a hundred years in the
Pacific was in allowing the Communists to grown in power in China.”72

All of these views about the strategic implications of China and Formosa stood in
contrast to those of Truman and his top advisors. To the Truman Administration the
‘loss’ of China was categorized as unfortunate, but not one of the upmost importance
because their lodestar of the region remained Japan and the rebuilding of Japan was their
top priority in the Far East. While a natural counter point to the Administrations reaction
was to emphasize the effect that the ‘loss’ of Chinese resources necessary for the
rebuilding and future of Japan, it was determined by the Administration that these lost
resources would not be the determining factor to the success or failure of Japan’s
reconstruction. The Administration fervently believed that other nations of Southeast
Asia could supplement the lost resources from China with no overriding effect on
Japan.73

When it came to assessing the significance of Formosa, the Truman
Administration shared some of the same concerns as General MacArthur did. In 1949,
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members of the Truman Administration agreed with the strategic importance outlined by
the JCS. So too did they recognize the agricultural and material benefit Formosa offered
Japan during peacetime. In time of war, they also agreed that possession of Formosa
offered any enemy of the United States great strategic potential. However, what differed
was the final assessment of how to handle the situation. In the opinion of the JCS, the
island of Formosa did not hold enough significance to “warrant the use of military force.”
Instead “the JCS urged the State Department to use diplomatic finesse and economic aid
to avert a CCP takeover.”74
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CHAPTER II
SOVIET STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES

When it came to assessing the strategic capabilities of the Soviet Union, the
Truman Administration and General MacArthur differed. In the wake of the events of
1949, culminating in the beginning of the Korean War, President Truman signed NSC68. As noted earlier, this policy paper stressed that the Soviet Union’s acquisition of the
atomic bomb threatened America’s war-winning capability and required a massive
American military expansion in response – an expansion that would take several years to
complete. However, unlike the NSC-68 view of the Soviet Union’s capabilities,
MacArthur thought the Soviet Union and its communist allies in Asia were comparatively
inferior to the United States. He argued that the Soviet Union’s atomic manufacturing
was in its infancy, that logistical problems weakened its military, and that its control over
its ally China was tenuous at best.

Contrary to NSC-68, MacArthur did not equate the Soviet Union’s nuclear
capability with a power shift. He stressed that the Soviet Union had only just developed
its own nuclear weapon in 1950; as he explained in his memoir, “at this time, while we
had the atomic bomb, she [the Soviet Union] had not yet developed its manufacture.”75
MacArthur believed that the Soviet Union, only having just developed the atomic bomb,
could not achieve a reasonable stockpile any time soon. MacArthur’s point was
corroborated by a CIA report, published in November 1950, which assessed the Soviet
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Union’s nuclear capabilities, outlining an estimated numerical difference of atomic
bombs between the Soviets and the United States. “The Soviets had fewer than 25 atomic
bombs,” noted the report, while the United States had a stock pile of “over 500 atomic
bombs and at least 264 nuclear-capable aircraft.”76 When MacArthur analyzed the
capabilities of the Soviet Union’s atomic weaponry, then, he saw a small stockpile and a
balance of power heavily favoring the United States.

MacArthur also perceived that the Soviet Air Force lacked bombers and had
logistical problems. During his congressional testimony he elucidated upon the current
makeup of the Soviet Union’s air strength in the Far East as being comprised of mainly
fighters, and “of those fighters, the majority are jets, and are excellent.”77 Only a small
number of Soviet bombers in the Far East existed that were capable of conducting
standard bombing attacks against allied positions, let alone executing bombing runs
outfitted with atomic bombs.78 MacArthur’s assessment of the Soviet bombing force
aligned with the CIA report, which stated that “the Soviets had … no effective means of
delivering” atomic bombs.79

Whatever the balance of atomic forces, MacArthur did not believe atomic
weaponry to be the ultimate weapon that could be substituted for an imbalanced or
outdated military. He viewed atomic weaponry as a complimentary weapon; it enhanced
a modern military, it did not create one. This notion served as the basis for MacArthur’s
overall assessment of the Soviet Union’s capabilities.

Military tactics had evolved over two World Wars. MacArthur saw the method by
which the United States defeated Japan as evidence that victory in war no longer revolved
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around armor and infantry. Instead success resided in the capability of a nation to control
the air and water, supplemented by a strong ground force. While a modern military
required diversity, which consisted of strength in equal sectors (air force, navy, and
army), a victorious modern military demanded it. Evidence of this sentiment can be
found in response to the question asked by Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman,
Committee on Armed Services) inquiring on the capabilities of the Soviet Navy. General
MacArthur testified that a balanced modern military resulted in success on the battlefield.
However, he explained that the Soviet Union had been unable to develop that necessary
part of its military since the time of the czars. He described the historical success that
Britain had in frustrating Russian attempts to access the warm waters of the
Mediterranean, by way of the battlefield or “in [sic] the utilization of the principle of the
balance of power, or in combinations and leagues of various nations to prevent that
tremendous expansion.” British success prohibited Russia the “chance to develop her
transportation, [and] water transportation facilities.” Without such development,
MacArthur exclaimed, “Russia could not dominate and control the world.”80

Furthermore, MacArthur speculated that the failure of prior czars to establish any
warm water ports in the Mediterranean influenced the Soviet Union deviated from prior
czarist goals in the west, to the east, in order to achieve modernization. However,
MacArthur pointed out that modernization would take time and that once the Soviets
secured access to warm water in the east they would enter “a different phase” of
development. In this phase he believed that the Soviet Union would be troubled by the
historic nature of its men, that the impedance to this modernization remained that “the
Russian has never been a seagoing man. It has been his enormous weakness. His great
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strength has always been on the ground.” Stressing that point, MacArthur explained that
for these reasons it would take them “decades, [or] some of us believe it centuries, to
develop a merchant marine and combat vessels to protect them. The Russians have never
shown that capacity in the slightest degree.” Such was the case with the Soviet Union’s
navy in the Far East. 81

Currently, in 1951, MacArthur testified that the Soviet Navy was still in its
infancy. He explained that those fleets which were located in the Far East, were the Fifth
and the Seventh Soviet fleets which were comprised of “light elements, cruiser, [and]
destroyer.” According to MacArthur, the main purpose of the submarines stationed there
was for defensive measures and their training only meant to deter any attempted
amphibious landing. In an open conflict, he assessed, the Soviet Union’s navy as a whole
“would not be a match either in quantity and certainly not in quality with our own
forces.” Compounding this weakness, according to MacArthur, was the perception that
the Soviet Union would not be capable of challenging the naval ability of the United
States for at least another decade. 82

Other than Soviet ground troops, MacArthur believed that the Soviet fighter
aircraft and pilots were of extreme value. However, he calculated that the capabilities of
Soviet fighter pilots could only be briefly maintained in an open war environment.
MacArthur contended that the capability of these units were severely hampered by
logistical issues. The General stated that in an open conflict the Soviet fighters would
suffer from “a lack of maintenance facilities, gasoline, petroleum supplies,” among other
things. He questioned their sustainability and how long they would be able to maintain
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the fighter’s mission readiness. In an all-out war, MacArthur asserted, Soviet fighter
“efforts would deteriorate from the beginning of hostilities.”83

In addition to its air power deficiencies and weak navy, MacArthur also thought
the Soviet Union faced logistical problems. MacArthur explained that the entire defense
of the Soviet Union depended upon the resources and support manufactured “almost
entirely out of European Russia.” MacArthur elucidated to Senator Russell that the
eastern part of the Soviet Union had “no industrial set-up of major proportion, so that all
of the munition equipment, all the strategic weapons, all of the sustenance that goes in in
such major quantity to support armed forces.” All of this operational “sustenance” had to
come from the west on a railway from “European Russia” to the required location in
Siberia. According to MacArthur, the Soviet Union had difficulty in maintaining the
resupplying needs in a non-war environment; the “line is strained to the very utmost now
to maintain on a normal peace basis the forces which the Soviet [Union] maintains in
Siberia.”84

The Trans-Siberian railroad supply-line also had a negative effect upon the Soviet
Union’s already hampered navy. Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Commander of U.S. naval
forces in the western Pacific, succinctly summarized MacArthur’s position concerning
the Soviet Union and its allies: “If the Soviet position in the [Russian] maritime provinces
is not integrated to the industrial and agricultural support of Manchuria, not supported by
the strategic reinforcement of warm water ports of Port Arthur, Dairen, and northern
Korea, and is forced to continue to be dependent upon a line of supplies over the trans-
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Siberian railway, the maritime province position continues to be a source of weakness
and vulnerability to Russia.” 85

In the event of an open war, the Soviet Union’s Trans-Siberian railroad would be
vulnerable. The United States, with one single strategic blow, MacArthur explained,
could paralyze the capabilities of the Soviet Union’s fighting force in the Far Eastern.
This single supply route stood out as a key strategic weakness of the Soviet Union.
MacArthur wrote, “this single railroad system” from Western Russia through Siberia, the
only means of mass troop movement and resupply, “could be cut by air interdiction
almost at will.”86 The ramifications of the destruction of the Trans-Siberian railroad
would devastate the Soviet Union’s Far Eastern flank.

The significance of this supply line did not only reside upon the Soviet required
resupply of its military in the Far East, but also the distribution of supplies to its allies.
The militaries of the PRC and DPRK had no modern capabilities and were completely
reliant upon supplies emanating from the Soviet Union – by way of the Trans-Siberian
railroad. The DPRKs capabilities, MacArthur informed Senator John C. Stennis, existed
as the result of trade with the Soviet Union; “It [the invasion of South Korea] could not
have been launched by the North Koreans without the supplies which were furnished
them by the Soviet.” 87 Absent of this, MacArthur contended, the DPRK would not have
had the material needed to wage war against South Korea.

This support served as a key factor that facilitated the Sino-Soviet Alliance.
Evidence of this can be seen in MacArthur’s conversations with Averell Harriman in
Tokyo on August 6 and 8, 1950. According to MacArthur, Harriman wrote, the Chinese
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preference was not “to come under Russian domination,” citing that, “[China had] have
historically opposed invasion from the North.”88 The devastation of World War II in
China followed by Civil War influenced the PRC to ally with the Soviet Union only for
tactical reasons, to consolidate power on mainland China, and get recognition in the
international community. This meant that, unlike the Truman Administration, MacArthur
viewed the PRC’s commitment to the Sino-Soviet Alliance as provisional, lasting only
until the PRC achieved modernization in significant portions of its military and solidify
its position in the international community, thereby achieving its goals.

In November of 1950, MacArthur noted his belief that similar to the Soviet
Union, the PRC also held imperialistic ideals.89 Similar to the desires of the Soviet
Union, MacArthur believed that the Chinese Communist sought expansion into
Manchuria, Formosa, Indo-China, and Korea.90 During a meeting with George Marshall
on November 7, MacArthur argued that Chinese intervention into the Korean War was
not done in defense of their boarders and the hydroelectric facilities along the Yalu River,
but instead provided proof of Red China’s “lust for the expansion of power.”91 He wrote
in his memoir an assessment of the Chinese Communists: “Through these past fifty years
the Chinese people have thus become militarized in their concepts and in their ideals.
They now make first class soldiers and are developing competent commanders and staffs.
This has produced a new dominant power in Asia, which for its own purpose has allied
with Soviet Russia, but which in its own concepts and methods has become aggressively
imperialistic, with a lust for expansion and increased power normal to this type of
imperialism.” 92 He perceived their aggressive actions in Indo-China, as well as Tibet and
now Korea, as proof of their own territorial desires.93 However, until that time came that
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the PRC could act solely independent, the PRC’s control over mainland China was
suspect, and the Chinese Civil War continued. This assessment convinced MacArthur
that, even in 1951, the Chinese Nationalists were capable of regaining the upper hand and
ultimately attaining victory over the Chinese Communists.

General MacArthur believed that the course of the Chinese Civil war could be
reversed in 1951 based upon his assessment of the vulnerability of the Chinese
Communist Forces (CCF). China “is a country of poverty. … They live only a couple
jumps ahead of starvation.”94 “Red China lacks the industrial capacity to provide
adequately many critical items necessary to the conduct of modern war,” MacArthur
argued. “He lacks the manufacturing base and those raw materials needed to produce,
maintain and operate even moderate air and naval power, and he cannot provide the
essentials for successful ground operations, such as tanks, heavy artillery and other
refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns.”95 The
vulnerability of the CCF also extended beyond complex military supplies to also include
basic battlefield necessities such as food and standard munitions.96 These military
deficiencies made the CCF reliant upon the Soviet Union for militarily essential ground
supplies, by way of the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

The PRC’s mass armies could not compensate for these weaknesses, MacArthur
argued. “Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap but with
the development of existing methods of mass destruction, numbers alone do not offset the
vulnerability inherent in such deficiencies.”97 He continued, “control of the seas and the
air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications and transportation, are no
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less essential and decisive now than in the past. When this control as in our case, and is
coupled with an inferiority of ground fire power as in the enemy’s case, the resulting
disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or the most
gross indifference to human loss.”98 China’s vulnerability was also magnified by its
dependence on the Trans-Siberian railroad. MacArthur testified that, “I believe that the
weakness of Red China, a weakness which is very noticeable in the air and on the sea, is
a corollary of the inability of the Soviet logistical system to send out those munitions to
assist its ally.”99 He continued, “the slightest dislocation in [China’s] normal process of
distribution,” by way of the Trans-Siberian railroad, “causes the greatest convulsions in
various sections of Chinese society.”100 For example, “if you disturb or should disturb in
the slightest degree the distributive systems of their food, you might well have
50,000,000 men, 50,000,000 people, starving at any one time.”101 For all of these reasons,
MacArthur fervently believed that, in conjunction with air and logistical support from the
United States, these weaknesses of the CCP could be exploited by the Chinese
Nationalists.

MacArthur had been supportive of the Chinese Nationalist for some time. In
1948, as the CCP had begun to dominate the field of battle over the KMT, the Secretary
of the Army, Kenneth Claiborne Royall, Sr. requested (through General Draper) the
opinion of General MacArthur “as to whether or not the U.S. should provide additional
military aid to China.” MacArthur described “the situation in China today as
deteriorating, but not yet hopeless.” In order prevent the situation from deteriorating any
further he advocated the immediate distribution “to the Chinese Government, of all US
military surpluses in the Pacific Area.” He went even further advocating that the Truman
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Administration should “take the wraps off our present advisory mission to the Chinese
Government;” instructing them “to get going, using all means in its power to advise the
Chinese military and to train China’s forces.” He also recommended that advisors should
additionally be sent “to other branches of the Chinese Government and we should send
officers to supervise the delivery to the field forces, of the equipment which we donate.”
In conjunction with military surpluses and advisors, MacArthur suggested that “moderate
economic and financial assistance” be provided, while “at the same time instituting
reasonable control measures to insure the most effective utilization of this assistance,
which in practicable in the circumstances.” This oversight caveat was needed, he
explained, because China’s current “methods are insufficient and many key officials are
corrupt.” General MacArthur believed that at that moment the United States, “would have
everything to gain and very little to lose by furnishing moderate support to the Chinese
Government at this critical time.”102

In the aftermath of the KMTs retreat to Formosa and the establishment of the
PRC, MacArthur believed that the Chinese Civil War was still yet to be won. This belief
was emboldened by the KMT victory over the CCF at the battle of Guningtou, October
25-27, 1949, which prohibited the CCP from conquering Formosa. Evidence of this
assessment resided in MacArthur’s reaction of disdain to the international recognition of
the PRC by the Soviet Union and Britain. Harriman wrote that MacArthur contended that
such recognition, “would only strengthen the prestige of Mao Tse-tung’s Government in
China and destroy what he considers should be our objective: splitting of the present
supporters of Mao Tse-tung and the developing of strengthened resistance
movements.”103 He argued that this recognition merely emboldened the temporary regime
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of Mao Zedong and the CCP.104 MacArthur remained unmoved by this event, even the
signing of the new Sino-Soviet Alliance in January of 1950.105 No event occurred that
would alter this position. He ardently believed that PRC control over China was only
temporary, either the communist government would fail on its own or eventually be
defeated by the Nationalists upon their return to the mainland.106

In 1950, following his unsanctioned visit to Formosa, MacArthur attempted to
persuade the Truman Administration on the reason for his visit and on the issue of
supporting the Chinese Nationalists. He explained to the State Department that his visit
was, “merely following the old precept that ‘The enemy of my enemy is my friend.’” Even
“if he has horns and a tail, so long as Chiang is anti-Communist, we should help him.”
Remonstrating he declared, “rather than make things difficult, the State Department
should assist him in his fight against the Communists—we can try to reform him
later.”107

MacArthur’s fervor on this issue was expressed succinctly during his testimony in
1951. Senator Wayne Morse inquired if the interdiction of Chinese Nationalists upon
mainland China could reverse the Chinese Civil War? MacArthur testified that he
“[understood] that in China, as in Russia, the number of Communists is rather small, in
proportion to the total population.” In the same line of questioning with Senator Morse,
MacArthur explained that utilization of Nationalist troops “would bring to life an
enormous number of Chinese who would take heart, and attempt to resist the present
regime of Red China.” MacArthur expounded, providing a blueprint that would result in
the CCP’s ultimate expulsion. Through “the use of the Nationalist troops, now, might
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result in greater support for the Nationalist troops than they received when the
Generalissimo was driven off the mainland, because of the experience of the Chinese
population with the tactics and methods of the Red Chinese.” The success of the
hypothetical operations that MacArthur described, to Senator Morse, remained in
conjunction with a bombing campaign initiated by the United States. The air campaign
would severely damage a majority of Chinese Communist Forces, which were stationed
in Manchuria. 108

The significance of this testimony can be seen in an analysis of his three
statements. To MacArthur communism was inherently oppressive, thus this inherent
nature would result in ostracizing a number of the populace. Therefore, it would only be
supported by a small portion of the population and power would only be maintained
through suppression of the majority through a culture of fear. Communism was no
different from the totalitarian regimes that once held power in Germany and Japan.
MacArthur contended that over time the Chinese populace had learned the true nature of
their communist regime and they desired freedom, a freedom which Nationalists forces
on Formosa could help achieve. MacArthur argued that this desire would lead to rebellion
against the tyrannical regime the moment that Nationalist forces landed on the mainland.

This time the civil war would be fought differently. The initial victories that were
granted to CCF over the KMT, according to MacArthur, were the result of the lack of
support provided by the Truman Administration. He explained to Senator Russell B.
Long that, “I believe that at that time the forces of the generalissimo were stronger than
the forces of the Chinese Communists against him. I believe that had we furnished a little
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added assistance to those forces, they would have been able to defeat the Chinese
Communist forces. I believe that the great lull that took place there enabled the Soviet
and others that were assisting the Chinese Communists to accelerate and accumulate a
sufficient balance of force which gave them victory.”109 This error in judgment by the
United States could be fixed. General MacArthur argued that with minor support from the
United States Chinese Nationalist forces would seize back control of mainland China.

The result of a KMT victory in the Chinese Civil War would have a ripple effect
throughout the world. Without support of the PRC, North Korea would be defeated
resulting in a unified Korea. The Soviet Union would lose its strategic allies in the Far
East, along with the warm water access that were gained through the alliances. The loss
of its warm water access in the Far East would negatively affect the development of the
Soviet Union’s navy, setting its modernization back decades more. The military
flexibility that had once been afforded by an alliance with China would no longer be
available. This affect would be detrimental to the Soviet Union’s expansionist desires
since the position of the United States would be expanded in the Far East forcing the
Soviet Union to remove vital military resources of its own from its position in the west to
the east in order to maintain security. This rebalancing of the Soviet military would
decisively shift the pendulum of power in the Cold War.

However, if prohibited from supporting the Chinese Nationalists against the PRC,
MacArthur believed that the United States could still defeat the Soviet Union and its
allies in an open war. Within the modern military construct, General MacArthur
identified that logistical impediments, such as those that plagued the Soviet Union and its
41

allies, prohibited the successful execution of war time practices. The PRC and North
Korea lacked any semblance of a modern military, and was entirely reliant upon the
Soviet Union for modern military supplies. What hindered the Soviet Union, according to
MacArthur, was their overwhelmingly limited logistical capability of supporting an
aggressive open war in the Far East while also maintain its position of strength in
Western Europe. The inability of the Soviet Union to have the capability to swiftly
transfer needed supplies from the western front to the eastern front in a time of war led
the General to believe that the United States position in the Pacific could bring to bear the
force necessary to win any open war in the Far East.110
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CHAPTER III
THE SOVIET AVERSION TO RISK

General MacArthur’s assessment of the Soviet Union included its capabilities,
and the methods that the Soviets preferred to achieve their goals. He thought, contrary to
the NSC-68 view, that the Soviet Union was cautious and risk-averse in its efforts to
expand. He insisted that the passivity of the United States to aggressively defend
strategically significant territories in the Far East played right into the Soviet Union’s
desire to expand without getting itself involved in a war.111 This was evident, he wrote, in
“the enormous expansion of Soviet influence since the end of World War II has been
brought about without the Russian soldier firing a shot in battle.”112 MacArthur wrote that
he saw the Soviet relationships with the DPRK and the CCP – in China and in Korea – as
evidence of the Soviet Union’s effort to gain control throughout the “entire area of the
Orient” by way of “political penetration.”113 When it came to warfare, the Soviet Union’s
policy, MacArthur wrote, “is not to sacrifice its own troops, but to use those of its
friends.”114 These two methods of expansion allowed the Soviet Union to maintain little
risk. MacArthur determined the Soviet Union to be prudent, utilizing subversive tactics to
achieve political influence in a country.

The initial experience of General MacArthur with the subversive tactics of the
Soviet Union’s expansion took place in Japan, as Commander in Chief of the Far East. In
1946, as part of the reconstruction process in Japan, MacArthur granted independence
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back to the organized labor movement.115 This resulted in the growth of organized labor.
Pre-war labor in Japan numbered under one dozen unions with nearly 100,000
members.116 From 1945 to 1948 these numbers grew exponentially, with the number of
unions totaling nearly 34,000 and the number of its members surpassing 6.6 million
people.117 This growth led to numerous strikes in which union members sought higher
wages. These strikes were resulted from the terrible living conditions of urban centers
throughout Japan. MacArthur saw that some of these unions came to be controlled by
communists who desired to utilize them as “instruments for prosecuting class war.”118
What troubled MacArthur, writes historian Geoffrey Perret, was “the prevalence of
Communists in the leadership of unions that represented government workers, such as
schoolteachers.”119 Fearful of the damage that these unions could cause, MacArthur
launched multiple purges in 1947 and 1948 against striking unions in order to eradicate
communists from the labor movement.120

These events in Japan, according to MacArthur, were supported by the Soviet
Union. The negotiations at the Yalta Conference in early 1945 demonstrated that Stalin
had desired to gain Japanese territory. Following the surrender of Japan in late 1945,
Stalin sought to divide Japan into sectors of influence, as had been done in Germany.
While this desire for sectors was also supported by the British and Australians,
MacArthur refused, believing that if the Soviets “were allowed in they would never leave
willingly.”121 However, MacArthur lacked the authority to make this decision and
eventually concessions were made by the United States at a conference in Moscow. 122
There allied members agreed to the creation of two councils; Allied Council for Japan
(ACJ) and the Far Eastern Commission (FEC).123 Although these councils were
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comprised of various nations, decisions regarding the politics of Japan could only be
implemented as the result of a majority vote from the four powers; the United States,
Britain, the Soviet Union, and China.124 Regardless of the agreements made at the
Moscow Conference providing nations a voice in post-war Japan, MacArthur, supported
by Truman, was allowed to ignore the desires of these advisory groups.125

The result of the Soviet Union’s inability to influence the organization of postwar Japan resulted in the utilization of other tactics, such as political infiltration and
propaganda. In his memoir, MacArthur wrote about his frustration with the Soviet
Union’s representative in the FEC. MacArthur declared that the Soviet Union had been
purposefully attempting to incite and promote anti-government feelings throughout the
Japanese people. In 1947, MacArthur perceived the Soviet representative in the FEC to
be attempting to undermine the “orderly [Japanese] government” by way of “derogatory
speeches and statements.” He publicly denounced these actions as a Soviet attempt to
“absorb Japan within the orbit of the Communistic ideology,” explaining that their “effort
has been incessant and relentless from the inception of the occupation.” He damned their
methods which “sought by every means within its power to spread discord and dissension
throughout this country reduced by the disasters of war to an economy of poverty
originally threatening the actual livelihood of the entire nation.” Although these
subversive tactics were unsuccessful they did not give up, noted MacArthur.126

Throughout the negotiation process and until the signing of the Treaty of San
Francisco on September 8, 1951, the Soviet Union used the Japan treaty negotiation
process as a propaganda tool to gain support among the Japanese. During a meeting with
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Sebald and Philip C. Jessup in Tokyo on January 9, 1950, MacArthur noted that “the
Russians are making considerable progress in their propaganda that it is the United States
which is holding up the Treaty.”127 Months later on June 14, MacArthur readdressed this
issue in his nineteen point Memorandum on the Peace Treaty Problem. MacArthur wrote,
“More recently the Soviet and Communist China publicly espoused an immediate peace
treaty for Japan as part of their treaty of alliance and entered upon a campaign of
propaganda charging that the Western Powers and particularly the United States bear
responsibility for the treaty delay, alleging for its purpose the ’colonization’ of Japan and
its use as a military base from which to mount aggressive warfare against the Soviet and
Communist China.”128 This propaganda, MacArthur wrote, “furnished… the international
press” with the perception that a conflict between the Department of State and the
Department of Defense had been the issue that prevented the creation of the peace
treaty.129 The result of the Soviet tactic of “exposing” the United States as being
responsible for the delay of the treaty, MacArthur hypothesized, could be “that an early
Soviet move may be to seize itself the initiative in calling upon the Powers to join it in
such a peace conference or proceed directly toward a separate peace with Japan.”130 “In
either such eventuality,” MacArthur explained, “the United States would indeed be
placed on the horns of a dilemma and our position would become virtually
irretrievable.”131 MacArthur speculated that the Soviet Union’s propaganda had an effect
not only on the perceptions of the international community but also among the Japanese
people. Therefore, MacArthur stressed that the Soviet Union’s propaganda would have a
disastrous effect upon the positon of the United States in Japan if they did not tread
carefully in the treaty process.
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This June 14 memorandum, written almost 5 years after the surrender of Japan,
noted the responsibility and delicate execution necessary to secure long term Japanese
relations with the United States. MacArthur argued that any further delay of the peace
treaty until it was assured that the United States would be allowed access to Japan’s
military bases “was ill-advised.”132 He reasoned that such a demand implied that the U.S.
cared more about “the defense of the United States rather than the defense of Japan.”133
The mindset of the Japanese had shifted as a result of this notion, MacArthur wrote. They
believed that the United States was “laying great stress upon the need for Japanese bases
in the United States Western Pacific defense line as a means of preserving United States
security.”134 This nationalistic turn within “Japanese political circles” had been “fanned
by Communist propaganda that the reservation of such military bases to the United States
would be a move toward the “colonization” of Japan and an aggressive threat against the
mainland of Asia.”135 MacArthur concluded that even in the event the United States
secured the bases, their value “to the United States would be limited by the bitterness and
resentments which would dominate the Japanese mind.”136

MacArthur stressed that the United States had to walk a fine line to achieve a
swift resolution to the current delays without creating a treaty that could displease the
Japanese people. While the Japanese people “fully understand and accepted the fact that
the delay in the restoration of such freedom has been due to the procedural difficulties
preventing the holding of a peace conference,” MacArthur explained, “once a formula is
found for arriving at a peace settlement, even if only based upon partial representation of
the Allied Powers, it would be impossible to explain with any semblance of sincerity or
validity the failure to grant the same.” Failure to construct a peace treaty that restored
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Japanese freedom would provide the Soviet Union more propaganda opportunities.
MacArthur doubted that the United States would be able to fight against this propaganda.
It would invariably succeed in convincing “many Japanese who have loyally supported
the occupation and worked diligently to achieve its stated objectives, that the aims and
purposes of the United States conform indeed to the line of Communist propaganda.” The
result of these failures, he stressed, would “arouse much bitter opposition in Japan and
push it into the Soviet camp. These tactics used by the Soviet Union in Japan were also
applied in North Korea and South Korea.137

Meanwhile in Korea, the Soviet Union had been steadily establishing its control
in North Korea, while maintaining aspirations for its expansion south. The Soviet Union
had been fully engaged in the affairs of the North Korean state since they accepted the
surrender of Japanese troops that were positioned north of the 38th parallel in 1945.
Instrumental in the rebuilding and reorganization of the North Korean government, the
Soviet Union assisted in the establishment and formation of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948. That same year the Soviet Union began training the
North Korean People’s Army (NKPA). Following the selection of Kim Il-sung as DPRK
leader, March 17, 1949 the DPRK and the Soviet Union signed an “agreement on
economic and cultural collaboration” which developed trade relations between the two
countries.138 This new agreement expanded the previous trading of weaponry, which
began in 1946, to now include heavy weaponry – such as artillery, tanks, and air craft.
This trading demonstrated to MacArthur the Soviet Union’s desire to fortify their
interests in North Korea.139 However, the political solidification that transpired in North
Korea – immediately after World War II and into 1946 – and the subsequent attempts to
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expand into South Korea demonstrated the Soviet Union’s method of expansion through
political infiltration.140

In the first months of 1946, General MacArthur sent a telegram to the Secretary of
State outlining the recent political developments of Korea. On February 12 Tass
announced, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, the establishment of the Korean
Central Government of North Korea. This government was comprised of a three party
system; Democratic Party, Yenan Independence League, and the Korean Communist
Party. The three party system projected to the entire Korean people and the international
community the presence of political option in a democratic society. However, MacArthur
and the South Korean government discredited this projection. The names of the members
of the North Korean government and council were “screened … by well informed
moderates now refugees from North Korea.” These defectors uncovered “that all [the]
names are either violent Communists or unknown Koreans brought in from Russia or
Manchuria.” Furthermore, the political parties held fallacious names. The Democratic
Party was “known to be Communist stooges named by Russians to replace the
Democratic leaders.” The Yenan Independence League was discovered to be a “ChineseKorean-Manchurian Communist group trained” by the Soviet Union. The final group, the
Korean Communist Party was described as puppets of the Soviet Union. Having taken
control of North Korea, MacArthur’s informed the Secretary of State that the Soviet
Union hoped to use the guise of the three party democracy in North Korea to influence
the political party formation in South Korea.141
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On February 14, leaders from various South Korean Communist parties – such as
the Communist Party of Korea, the People’s Party, “farmers associations, Labor Unions,
and the People’s Republic” – gathered together and, influenced by North Korea,
rebranded themselves the “Democratic People’s Front.” Upon the solidification of the
North Korean government and the formation of the Democratic People’s Front in South
Korea, propaganda began to arise calling for the formation of centralized government of
all Korea. A South Korean local newspaper, noted MacArthur, wrote “that now the
“People’s Government” has been set up in north Korea and the “Democratic Front” is
perfected in south Korea, the problem of interim Korean Government is a simple gettogether of the two.” This publication “together with all the other trends and activities,”
MacArthur explained, provided reasonable evidence that would suggest that the
Democratic People’s Front, led by the People’s Party, here had “completely sold out to
the Russian directed communists” for guaranteed government positions in the coming
United Korea. The press publication coupled with the political maneuvering of South
Korean communist groups to create a democratic society guided MacArthur to write that
the, “Russians no doubt plan to force us to accept their Government as the Democratic
representatives of north Korea while trying to force us to give enough Communistic
representation from south Korea to gain control of Korean interim Government by
Communists.” He noted that his duty to maintain the “prestige of the Korean
Representative Democratic Council” by achieving full support of the Korean people and
by discrediting the communists. MacArthur concluded with a warning to the Secretary of
State that these events in Korea, as well as those currently occurring in Manchuria,
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demonstrated that the Communists are in “an all-out effort now to gain full control of this
entire area of the Orient through political penetration.”142

All of these events in both Japan and Korea proved to MacArthur that the Soviet
Union preferred expansion through political infiltration. MacArthur also saw Soviet
caution in its apparent preference to let its allies expand communism through force rather
than risk initiating a fight the West itself. This perspective can be seen in MacArthur’s
assessment of Korea in 1949-50. The North Korean leader Kim Il-sung was an extreme
nationalist who desired to unite all of Korea under communist rule. Similar to his
counterpart in South Korea, Syngman Rhee, Kim Il-sung used his new expanded armory
to conduct frequent border raids along the 38th parallel, in 1949.143 That autumn tensions
were raised by these actions, and some leaders in Washington worried that a war might
erupt. MacArthur, however, saw little need to worry about any possible military action.
He maintained that the monolithic nature of communism present in North Korea
prohibited them from acting autonomously from the Soviet Union in seeking their goal of
the unification of Korea.144 In September of that same year, this sentiment was reiterated
in more detail to congressional committee members who were visiting MacArthur in
Japan: “South Korea is in no danger of being overrun by North Korea. The Kremlin has
South Korea outflanked and knows that eventually it must go the way the continent of
Asia goes. As long as South Korea is not a threat to North Korea, no action will be taken
by the Kremlin to absorb it as there would be nothing to gain by taking it over. However,
if South Korea tries to take over North Korea, retaliatory measures could certainly be
expected.”145
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The outbreak of the Korean War had many officials throughout Washington D.C.
and the Truman Administration extremely fearful. Dean Acheson explained his concern
at a National Security Council Meeting, November 28, 1950; “Time is shorter than we
thought,” Acheson declared. “We used to think we could take our time up to 1952, but if
we were right in that, the Russians wouldn’t be taking such terrible risks as they are
now.”146 They believed that the Soviet Union’s willingness to take risks exceeded their
assessment outlined in NSC-68.147 MacArthur, on the other hand, supported the complete
opposite position, even though he had not expected the North Korean attack. He
acknowledged in his description of North Korean forces, to Acheson, the source of their
support, “North Korean military forces are as previously reported, backed by
considerable strength in armor and a well-trained, well directed and aggressive air force
equipped with Russian planes. It is now obvious that his force has been built as an
element of Communist military aggression.”148 However, MacArthur did not believe that
this confirmed the NSC-68 view of a risk taking overly aggressive Soviet expansion.
Following the initial invasion by North Korean forces, Macarthur met with John Foster
Dulles, William J. Sebald, and John M. Allison and expressed his belief that “the attack
was not an all-out effort [and] the Soviets were not necessarily behind the attack.”149 He
contended that the Soviet Union’s obvious military inaction provided the proof that they
were still yet unprepared to militarily expand. The North Korea invasion had been
initiated almost a year after both the Soviet Union and United States removed their armed
forces from North and South Korea respectively.150 Soviet troops did not participate in
any aspect of the fighting. Even after the United States joined the fighting and
significantly reversed the course of the war, the Soviet Union remained on the outside,
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preferring instead to propagandize the Korean War as a civil war that should be left out of
international intervention. Evidence of this can be seen in Soviet press publications which
were available throughout the world. The Soviet Union was outraged at the U.N.’s
process and conclusion to intervene in what they saw as a civil war. They decried the
U.N. Security Council for ignoring the new international law and kowtowing to U.S.
desires. On August 6-7, 1950, the Pravda and Izvestia ran editorials entitled “Comment
and Reports on the Korean War,” which examined the U.N. decisions against
International Law in order to expose the Western Powers deviation from international
doctrine which was created to prevent war: “The United Nations Charter, which obligates
the Security Council to take measures necessary to preserve and maintain international
peace and security, stipulates inter alia that “it shall not authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially in the domestic jurisdiction of any state”
(Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the U.N. Charter).” The Soviet Union not only condemned the
Security Council’s decision but also attempted to expose American imperialism as having
been the motivating factor: “No matter how much the American imperialists have tried,
no matter how much their representative in the Security Council has dodged, perverting
the most important principles and standards of international law, no matter how much the
obedient satellites of the U.S.A. in the agencies of the United Nations have voted on
orders from Washington, there is no force in the world capable of depicting as aggression
the liberation movement of the Korean people, who are fighting for their national
unification and independence.”151 Was this assessment of the Soviet Union just a large
oversight by MacArthur?
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Insight into this understanding was provided by the General during his meeting
with President Truman at Wake Island on October 10, 1950. In this meeting, MacArthur
told Truman that there was “very little” chance Soviet Union would get involved in
Korea because they have too few controlling assets in the region to mount a credible
offensive. MacArthur assumed that the Soviet Union partially recognized this “selfweakness” and would thus not intervene because their men and equipment would just be
lost: “They have an Air Force in Siberia and a fairly good one,” however, “they are
probably no match for our Air Force” MacArthur determined. Furthermore, the Soviet
Union has “no ground troops available for North Korea.” In the event that they attempted
to mobilize troops into the field, it would take “six weeks to get a division across” and in
six weeks winter will have also arrived compounding the issue.” Absent the capability of
employing its ground forces in a timely manner, MacArthur explained to Truman that
their “only other combination would be Russian air support of Chinese ground troops.”
Currently, “Russian air is deployed in a semicircle throughout Mukden and Harbin, but
the coordination between the Russian air and the Chinese ground would be so flimsy that
I believe Russian air would bomb the Chinese as often as they would bomb us. Between
untrained Air and Ground Forces an air umbrella is impossible without a lot of joint
training. I believe it just wouldn’t work with Chinese Communist ground and Russian
air.” MacArthur speculated that the Soviet Union recognized these tactical deficiencies in
the Far East, safely remaining outside the war zone, building her up military. This riskaverse assessment by MacArthur applied to not only the Soviet Union but also the
Chinese Communists.152
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In 1950, although they shared a closer regional connection than the Soviet Union,
the Chinese Communist support for North Korea was given little consideration by
General MacArthur. He assessed that, even though North Koreans fought with Chinese
Communist forces in Chinese Civil War, there was little reason for the PRC to get
involved in the Korean War. MacArthur echoed this belief to President Truman on Wake
Island; stating that there was “very little” chance of PRC involvement in the Korean
War.153 He explained that if the PRC chose to intervene they would have “in the first or
second months” and “it would have been decisive.” He continued, “We are no longer
fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand.” (Although his analysis of
Chinese dedication was later to be incorrect his assessment of Chinese capabilities
remained consistent throughout the war.) He explained to Truman that the Chinese had
300,000 men positioned in Manchuria and “of these probably not more than 100,000125,000 are distributed along the Yalu River.” Of those, “only 50,000-60,000 could be
gotten across the Yalu River” – admittedly the freezing of the Yalu River changed this
perception as it allowed Chinese forces to flow across the border by way of this natural
bridge. MacArthur concluded that their lack of Air Force coupled with the establishment
of UN airfields and Air Force in Korea would cause the “greatest slaughter” “if the
Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang.”154 Any attempt by the Chinese Communists to
intervene, MacArthur contended, could be easily thwarted by UN forces due to their vast
technological superiority. MacArthur’s strategic assessment was predicated upon the idea
that if the Chinese attempted to fully intervene that he would be allowed to utilize all
options in order to swiftly and decisively crush the enemy forces. Furthermore, it can be
assumed that MacArthur believed that the PRC too recognized the futility of an attempted
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intervention in Korea. Evidence of this can be found in MacArthur’s dismissal of the
Chinese premier Chou En-lai’s threat - relayed though the Indian Foreign Minister Sardar
Pannikar – that the CCF would not intervene in the entry of South Korean forces in North
Korea, however, “an American intrusion into North Korea will encounter Chinese
resistance.”155 Truman and MacArthur alike paid little heed to this warning. MacArthur
commented to the United States Air Force (USAF) Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg, that
“the only passages leading from Manchuria and Vladivostok have many tunnels and
bridges,” which could be easily destroyed with airpower.156 The troop movement and
building up of Chinese Communist Forces in Manchuria did little to alter MacArthur’s
assessment that they would not intervene. They were bluffing, with a show of force.

In November 1950, only after confirmed reports, did MacArthur finally believe
that the Chinese were in North Korea. His initial assessment of Chinese intervention,
made on November 14, 1950 in meeting with Ambassador Sebald, was founded upon
China’s self-interests. Sebald wrote that MacArthur “expressed the opinion that the entry
of Communist China into the Korean War was largely motivated by the Chinese
themselves, and that such entry is merely one more manifestation of what he termed
“Chinese imperialistic aspirations.”157 These aspirations, MacArthur noted, that were also
present in Communist China’s invasion of Tibet and in the assistance of Ho Chi Minh,
were conducted on its own accord.158 However, MacArthur continued to explain that he
believed that the CCF did not intervene in the Korean War to achieve any kind of victory.
Instead he felt that the CCF sought to demonstrate “their desire to be of assistance to the
North Koreans, and … also to [prove] to the world their ability to engage in a first-class
war.” MacArthur defended this belief explaining that the delayed entry of CFF proves
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that they “they had not thought it necessary previously to enter into the war, as they had
believed that the North Koreans would drive the UN Forces into the Sea.” The UN
counter offensive at Inchon demonstrated to the Chinese Communists that “something
must be done.” However, this delayed decision to militarily assist the North Koreans
resulted in wasted time for the necessary relocation of CCF “armies and supplies from
Central and South to the northeast.”159

The shifting assessment of the desires and capabilities of the Chinese Communist
in regards to the Korean War is connected in some manner to the consistent assessment
of the desires and capabilities of the Soviet Union. MacArthur felt that the CCF would
not involve themselves in the Korean War because the PRC understood that its forces
could not defeat UN Forces. Newly established and vying for international recognition as
a legitimate government, the PRC – he believed – would not risk losing its gains in China
with a war against the UN in Korea. Had the CCF joined in the initial assault against
South Korea, MacArthur argued, the risk would have been drastically less.

The CCF intervention had enacted the prohibitive clause in MacArthur’s NSC-81
directive which outlined that “in the event of the occupation of North Korea by Soviet or
Chinese Communist Forces … no ground operations north of the 38th parallel … should
[be] undertaken.”160 Following the intervention of the CFF MacArthur believed “that
Soviet Russia, despite its satisfaction derived from action parallel to its own objectives,
has remained in the background.”161 Wishing to maintain the NSC-81 goal of unification
and in the face of wavering commitment to its achievability from the Truman
Administration, he remained adamant that “there is no evidence available that Soviet
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Russia is taking a direct part in the Korean War. While, admittedly, the material being
used by the North Koreans and Chinese Communists is of Soviet origin, the General
believed that the North Koreans and Chinese Communists have paid for such in either
cash or kind.”162 These statements made in MacArthur’s conversation with Ambassador
Sebald, deviated from MacArthur’s initial assessment of the Soviet’s support of the
invasion. The reason for this would have been not only the lack of evidence of expanded
Soviet support outside of the original support given in the creation of the North Korean
Army, but also active military support. At the time of that November meeting the North
Koreans were all but defeated and CCF’s had just begun their counter offensive. The
situation was not as dire as it would become in later months. So to MacArthur it seemed
that the Soviet Union, due to their lack of open military support, was indifferent to the
outcome of the Korean War. It was not until his Senate hearings that MacArthur
attempted to revise his original statements: “I am… convinced that all three [North
Korea, China, and Russia] were in the general conspiracy to make that attack in North
Korea. It could not have been launched by the North Koreans without the supplies which
were furnished them by the Soviet. It could not have been kept up without the actual
national assistance by the Chinese Red army.”163 MacArthur continued to explain that
since “it takes time to organize such an army as that North Korean army was,” an
agreement of some type must have been made “before the attack was launched, I believe
it was conceived months before it was actually launched.”164 MacArthur’s evolved
opinion, in this context, does not discredit his final perception of the Soviet Union’s
methods. It revealed the goals and willingness of the Soviet Union to achieve its goals.
When military force was required to expand or solidify a newly established government,
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it would not be the military forces of the Soviet Union that fought but the forces of its
allies. It is in this retrospective view that the Soviet Union sought to maintain its distance
and international deniability.

The inaction of the Soviet Union in Korea was evidence, MacArthur believed,
that the Soviets recognized their own comparative weakness. If the Soviet Union assessed
its comparative capabilities as in line with those outlined in NSC-68, then why were they
risk-averse when it came to waging an open war? Why were they allowing the inferior
militaries of other communist nations to fight their wars? This self-understanding guided
the Soviet Union in its risk-averse expansion. The Korean War was MacArthur’s proof.
This notion was the factor that resonated within MacArthur’s messages to the JCS and
other United States officials when he explained that the Soviet Union would not enter and
could not be enticed into the Korean conflict. The evidence, MacArthur argued, existed in
the Soviet Union’s absence of open activity in key periods of the Korean War; the initial
invasion, Inchon, and what became known as MacArthur’s Christmas offensive.

After the PRC intervened, MacArthur remained consistent in his assessment of
the Soviet Union. He insisted that the events of the Korean War had no bearing upon the
decision of whether or not the Soviet Union would go to war. He contended that the
Soviet Union would only engage in an open conflict if it thought that victory was
guaranteed. He stated multiple times throughout his Congressional testimony the belief
that the Soviet Union would not begin a Third World War if the United Nations became
more aggressive in their war effort in the Far East. MacArthur contended that the Soviet
Union would act in its best interest regardless of the UNs actions: “If [the Soviet Union]
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has determined that he is not going to attack, that he is doing well enough in the present
atmosphere, that he is acquiring and expanding as rapidly as he can digest it; and that he
is not going to attack, and that is his basic policy – I do not believe that anything that
happens in Korea, or Asia, for that matter, would affect his basic decision.”165 MacArthur
continued, “if he has determined that he is going to use force, sooner or later, what occurs
in Korea, or Asia, might affect his timetable. I believe that he will make his decisions on
a higher basis than the incidents that are occurring in Asia.”166 MacArthur held the notion
that the overall basis for the Soviet Union’s decision to go to war would be based upon
their assessment of the strength of the enemy and themselves.167 MacArthur explained to
Senator J.W. Fulbright, “The greater relative strength that they possess and have would
probably be an inducement if they decided to go to force instead of their present political
force.”168

Further evidence of the Soviet Union’s risk-averse methods resided in the
locations in which they sought to expand. While Japan and Germany were key strategic
goals of the Soviet Union, they did not aggressively pursue them. They sought Greece,
Eastern Europe, Middle Eastern locations, and nations in the Far East – such as
Manchuria, Tibet, and Korea. When questioned by Senator Long, MacArthur agreed with
the Senator’s statement “that wherever the Communists knew they were not having or
going to have resistance, they invariably went.”169 MacArthur summarized, “They
exploited the weak points.”170 Why would a nation that was drastically stronger, as NSC68 suggested, focus only on gaining ground in weak areas? More importantly, why would
they risk the success of their expansion with the use of its allies’ forces which were
comparatively inferior to the forces they faced on the battlefield?
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MacArthur argued that the Soviet Union’s continued reliance upon its Far Eastern
allies to defeat United Nations forces in Korea, at the risk of losing their gains, was proof
not only of the Soviet Union’s weakness, but also their risk-averse strategy. The
perceived risk-averse expansionist nature of the Soviet Union affected MacArthur’s
perception of the Soviet Union’s capabilities because they were fundamentally
connected. He believed that the Soviets’ chosen actions reflected a self-analysis, which
demonstrated that they recognized their own weaknesses and self-belief that they were
not yet prepared to win an open war against the United States. This was evident, to
MacArthur, in the Soviet Union’s actions in Japan, China, and Korea, most notably in the
Korean War.
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CHAPTER IV
MACARTHUR’S POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The policy recommendations of General MacArthur during the Korean War were
formulated around his strategic assessments. First, MacArthur saw Asia as key to the
balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, because the spread of
communism in Asia gave the Soviet Union access to vital resources and secured its flank
which enhanced their position in Europe. Second, the General believed the Soviet Union
and the People’s Republic of China to be weak militarily, suffering from logistical
vulnerabilities, a lack of nuclear weapons and bombers, and the PRC had yet to even
consolidate power at home. Finally, MacArthur saw the Soviet Union as risk averse in its
communism expansion strategy. These views guided MacArthur to promote an
aggressive strategy during the Korean War aiming to attain a complete victory. The
Korean War, MacArthur insisted, represented an opportunity to inflict a major defeat on
the Soviet Union with little risk of sparking a general war, because the Soviet Union
would not risk intervening in the conflict.

The success at the Battle of Inchon in September 1950 had General MacArthur’s
confidence soaring and seeking to unite Korea. However, the decision had already been
made by Truman, near the end of August, to pursue the enemy northward.171 The official
order was issued in NSC 81 to MacArthur on September 16. The restrictions placed upon
MacArthur were limited to the scenario of Chinese or Soviet Union intervention. In the
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event that either nation militarily presented itself, MacArthur was directed to cease
advancement. Furthermore, upon approach to the Yalu River South Korean forces will be
the vanguard.172 The directive of NSC 81 was “the pursuance of a rollback.”173
Understanding this directive and eager to unify Korea, MacArthur proceeded with the
utmost confidence in his ability and the ability of his forces aggressively drove north
across the 38th parallel.

The drive north followed the guidelines of NSC 81 until October 17. MacArthur
defied the JCS directive to halt his forces at the determined defensive line “running from
Chongju to Hungnam” and use Republic of Korea (ROK) forces to conduct military
operations north of that line. Instead, he secured a defensive line well north of the JCS
directive and ordered General Walker and General Almond “to drive forward with all
speed and … use any and all ground forces … to secure all of North Korea.”174 This
deviation from NSC 81 guidelines demonstrated that MacArthur desired to unify all of
Korea and completely destroy the DPRK and its forces.

In early October reports of Chinese Communist soldiers operating in North Korea
began circulating.175 It was not until October 22 that CCF began operating in full force
across the Yalu River. These Sino-Korean units had success against the 8th Army and
other United Nations forces driving them from the Yalu River. This counter offensive by
the CCF and the subsequent surge of CCF units across the Yalu River following its initial
success urged MacArthur to request authorization from the JCS to bombard the bridges.
MacArthur’s rationale was that the “way to stop this reinforcement of the enemy is the
destruction of these bridges and the subjection of all installations in the north area
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supporting the enemy advance to the maximum of our air destruction.”176 The JCS denied
this request. Then on November 7 the enemy, inexplicably, broke contact and withdrew
back into Manchuria. This withdrawal had MacArthur convinced that although elements
of the CCF intervened, he did not believe that the entirety of the CCF was committed,
these soldiers had been merely volunteers.177 With this assertion, along with the assessed
comparative capabilities of the CCF, MacArthur believed that United Nation forces could
resume their maneuver north to eradicate DPRK forces and unify Korea. This knowledge
guided the planning of the Home by Christmas Offensive, also known as “reconnaissance
in force.”178 On November 24, further deviating from the JCS directive, MacArthur
launched a campaign to end the war. After three days of advancing without heavy
opposition they were met by the full weight of a CCF counter attack. The superiority of
MacArthur’s air and artillery was negated by the tactics of the CCF.179 These tactics
enabled them to route large sections of UN forces; forcing their retreat and recapturing
the key cities of Pyongyang and eventually Seoul on January 4, 1951. The CCF
maintained pressure upon UN forces for the rest of that year and into the spring. The
aggressiveness and success of the CCF led MacArthur to send a telegram three days after
beginning the offensive, in which he described to the JCS that the full force of the CCF
had created “an entirely new war.”180

This “new war” caused MacArthur to believe that he should be permitted to meet
this force with equal force.181 He believed that this new scenario should allow him
expanded options to utilize any military means necessary to defeat the enemy in Korea
and secure Korea. Although he asked repeatedly for reinforcements, in the early weeks of
December MacArthur also sought permission to have the freedom to determine the
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implementation of atomic weaponry.182 One of the earlier examples of this came on
December 24, MacArthur submitted to his superiors “a list of retardation targets” of the
CCF that required twenty-six atomic bombs.183 This list provides one of the earlier
examples of MacArthur’s desire and willingness to achieve a victory in Korea.

Six days later, on December 30, 1950, MacArthur telegrammed the JCS outlining
the strategic crossroads facing the United States and the United Nations. In it he
described two paths, one of which would result in the degradation of the United Nations,
including the initial step in an eventual rollback of the United States defensive perimeter.
The second path would be to meet the enemy on the battlefield, matching equal force
with equal force. In the case the JCS sought to pursue victory, MacArthur devised a
comprehensive four step plan that he believed would ensure victory. MacArthur outlined
that the moment the United Nations recognized the new state of war the following four
measures should be implemented: “Blockade the coast of China; Destroy through naval
gun fire and air bombardment China’s industrial capacity to wage war; Secure
reinforcements from the Nationalist garrison on Formosa to strengthen our position in
Korea if we decided to continue the fight for that peninsula; and release existing
restrictions upon the Formosa garrison for diversionary action (possibly leading to
counter-invasion) against vulnerable areas of the Chinese mainland.”184

On January 9, 1951, he JCS responded to MacArthur detailing what the “new
war” strategy would be: “There is little possibility of policy change or other external
eventuality justifying strengthening our effort in Korea.” The JCS cautioned MacArthur’s
blockade proposal of the Chinese Coast responding that the “blockade of China Coast, if
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undertaken, must await either stabilization of our position in Korea or our evacuation
from Korea. However, a naval blockade of the coast of China would require negotiations
with the British in view of the extent of British trade with China through Hongkong. It is
considered necessary to obtain UN concurrence.” They accepted his proposed “Naval and
air attacks on objectives in Communist China” adding the caveat “only if the Chinese
attack United States forces outside of Korea and decision must await that eventually.”
The proposed use of Chinese Nationalists as reinforcements for Korea was deemed too
risky by the JCS because “in view of improbability of their decisive effort on the Korean
outcome and their probable greater usefulness elsewhere.” The JCS had become tired of
fielding MacArthur’s persistent requests for reinforcements, so they followed their
response to the proposed nationalist reinforcements with the final opinion on
reinforcements in Korea: “If our position in Korea could be stabilized with forces now
committed, 2 partly-trained National Guard Divisions could be deployed to Japan in
order to increase the security of Japan. If our Korean position cannot be stabilized, this
means purpose must be served by part of the troops evacuated from Korea. This is the
final reply to your [previous requests for reinforcements].” However, the JCS did accept
two portions of MacArthur’s proposal: The rearmament of Japanese Security Forces and
intensifying the economic blockade of trade with China.185

Overall, the cautioned MacArthur fearful that expanding military operations in
Korea could jeopardize the United States strategic holdings in Western Europe and Japan.
They believed that if MacArthur’s four point plan was enacted that the Soviet Union
would then intervene. The last portion of the JCS telegram to MacArthur was a directive
as to his mission in the current conditions of the Korean War: “Defend in successive
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positions as required … inflicting maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea, subject to
primary consideration of the safety of your troops and your basic mission of protecting
Japan.” The JCS concluded in their instructions with two points: First, “Should it become
evident in your judgment that evacuation is essential to avoid severe losses of men and
material you will at that time withdraw from Korea to Japan.” Second, “All directives and
instructions in conflict with the foregoing are revoked.” This final instruction is
significant because this directive was designed to prevent MacArthur from continuing to
conduct the Korean War as he saw fit, using old JCS directives as proof of permission.186

This shift in strategy by the JCS and the Truman Administration did not sit well
with MacArthur. He believed that the goal of unifying Korea should remain. The
entrance of the PRC into the war had presented itself as a prime opportunity for the
United States and the United Nations to achieve a dramatic strategic shift in the power
dynamic of the Far East. Continuing to fight for the victory was necessary and of the
upmost importance in order to not only secure the defensive perimeter of the United
States but also their position in the Far East as well as Europe. MacArthur rebuked the
JCS decision and described the strategic ramifications of abandoning the fight in Korea,
“If we are forced to evacuate Korea without taking military measures against China
proper, as you suggested in your message, it would have the most adverse effect upon the
people of Asia, not excepting the Japanese, and a material reinforcement of the forces
now in this theater would be mandatory if we are to hold the Littoral Defense Chain
[Ryukyus and Philippines] including Japan against determined assault.”187 Here
MacArthur argued that the abandonment of Korea by the Truman Administration would
only force the United States to retain more resources and materials in the Far East in
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order to deter any potential offensive against its defensive perimeter. Furthermore, this
transfer of resources would be a permanent necessity and not a temporary one. However,
this would be avoided if MacArthur was granted flexibility and temporary access to the
some of the military resources in Europe to achieve a victory in Korea. The permanent
transfer of resources, MacArthur contended, would have an effect on the security of
Europe to the extreme of insuring the “later defeat in Europe itself.”188 “On the other
hand,” MacArthur explained, “if the primary political interest of the United States in the
Far East lies in holding a position in Korea and thus pinning down a large segment of the
Chinese military potential, the military course is implicit in political policy and we should
be prepared to accept whatever casualties result and any attendant hazard to Japan’s
security.”189

Furthermore, MacArthur rebuked the idea that the Soviet Union would militarily
respond to any action of the United Nations or the United Sates in the Korean War.
MacArthur challenged the Administration’s perceived notion that his plan of action
would result in the immediate entrance of the Soviet Union into the war. He advised the
JCS that the Soviet Union’s decision to enter into the Korean War could not influenced
by the actions of the United Nations or the United States in Korea.190 The Soviet Union
would only enter into a war or openly incite one if they believed that they could achieve a
victory. “Some say to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China; others,
to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid. For China is already
engaging with maximum power it can commit and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh
its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike
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whenever it feels that the relativity in military and other potential is in its favor on a
world –wide basis.”191

Seen in this example is one of MacArthur’s attempts to persuade the JCS to
understand that the current situation in Korea had only two possible outcomes; victory or
defeat. In defeat, the United States would be forced to abandon Korea to the Chinese
Communists, and more importantly, to communism. This would inherently mean that the
Soviet Union’s position in the Far East would have been drastically bolstered, to include
the potential of Soviet success in securing Japan, either politically or militarily. However,
in victory the United States would have unified Korea and delivered a devastating defeat
against the Chinese Communists, with the possibility of turning the tide of the Chinese
Civil War. This would have led to the ‘rollback’ of communism in Asia, striking a
devastating blow to the Soviet Union in the process.

As the Korean War dragged on, it became clearer in the late winter and early
spring of 1951 that the mindset of the United Nations and the Truman Administration
was to return to Korea’s antebellum division. General MacArthur despised this mentality.
He argued, during his second counter offensive south of the 38th parallel, that the return
to the antebellum structure of Korea would continue to allow the PRC to maintain its
aggressive attitude in Asia along with “her power to make war.” Therefore, he planned
and carried-out the counter offensive, in February 1951, with some of the same tactics
that made the Inchon operations successful. These tactics were not designed for a simple
military advance back to the 38th parallel. MacArthur hoped that he could break the back
of the CCF just as he had the North Korean Forces in the war’s first counter offensive.192
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The intervention of the PRC was often blamed upon the actions of MacArthur on
his drive to the Yalu River. By using MacArthur’s “guarantee” of nonintervention of
CCFs in Korea at the Wake Island conference, the Truman Administration maintained
public support for a limited war strategy. MacArthur, in complete opposition to this,
wrote public letters and traded correspondence with Republican leaders promoting his
belief in his strategy for victory. His strategy for victory remained the same, even after
the signing of the armistice.

In the aftermath of General MacArthur’s dismissal from his Far Eastern
command, he returned to the United States and toured the United States giving speeches.
However, first and foremost on his agenda was a speech on April 19 in front of a joint
session of Congress, as well as testifying before the Committee on Armed Services and
the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. These political platforms
provided General MacArthur the opportunity for the first time to address Congress and
expound upon his strategic beliefs in an attempt to repair his reputation as a fanatical
warmonger.193 Before the joint session of Congress MacArthur refuted this depiction,
“Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war as few other men now living know
it, and nothing is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition. … But
once war is forced on us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means
to bring it to a swift end. War’s very object is victory – not prolonged indecision. In war,
indeed, there can be no substitute for victory.”194 This was how MacArthur perceived the
concept of conducting warfare. When engaged in a military struggle the goal should be
victory, there are no political victories in war.
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Shortly after MacArthur’s April 19 address he was called upon to testify before
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations. During
MacArthur’s four day testimony he explained and reiterated his assessments of the
strategic importance of the Far East, as well as the capabilities and strategy of the Soviet
Union and its allies, and his victory strategy in Korea. Portions of his testimony were
aimed to show a shared assessment between himself and the JCS. However, these claims
were not substantiated in the testimonies of the members of the JCS. This resulted in the
eventual political disassociation of General MacArthur from influential figures, who
might have – at one time or another – sought his strategic assessment on issues. The final
meeting MacArthur had with the purpose of advising came in 1952 with President elect
Dwight Eisenhower.

In late 1952, President elect Eisenhower went to Korea on a campaign promise.
Upon his return one of the first meetings he held was with the retired Douglas
MacArthur. MacArthur had been stating since late 1951 that he had a plan to officially
end the war in Korea. While the JCS requested that he reveal his plan to them, MacArthur
preferred to explain it in person to his former subordinate. On December 17, 1952
MacArthur presented to Eisenhower his “Memorandum on Ending the Korean War.”
Within this memorandum were eight points:

(1) “Call a two-party conference between the President of the United States and
Premier Stalin.
(2) That such a conference explore the world situation as a corollary to ending the
Korean War.
(3) That we insist that Germany and Korea be permitted to unite under forms of
government to be popularly determined upon.
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(4) That thereafter we propose that the neutrality of Germany, Austria, Japan and
Korea be guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet with all other nations
invited to join as co-guarantors.
(5) That we agree to the principle that in Europe all foreign troops should be removed
from Germany and Austria, and in Asia from Japan and Korea.
(6) That we urge that the United States and the Soviet [Union] undertake to endeavor
to have incorporated in their respective constitutions a provision outlawing war as
an instrument of national policy, with all other nations invited to adopt similar
moral limitations.
(7) That at such conference, the Soviet [Union] be informed that should an agreement
not be reached, it would be our intention to clear North Korea of enemy forces.
(This could be accomplished through the atomic bombing of enemy military
concentrations and installations in North Korea and the sowing of fields of
suitable radio-active materials, the by-product of atomic manufacture, to close
major lines of enemy supply and communication leading south from the Yalu,
with simultaneous amphibious landings on both coasts of North Korea.
(8) That the Soviet [Union] be further informed, in such eventuality, it would
probably become necessary to neutralize Red China’s capability to wage modern
war. (This could be accomplished by the destruction of Red China’s limited
airfields and industrial and supply bases, the cutting of her tenuous supply lines
from the Soviet [Union] and the landing of Chin’s Nationalist forces in Manchuria
near the mouth of the Yalu, with limited continuing logistical support until such
time as the communist government of China has fallen. This concept would
become the great bargaining lever to induce the Soviet to agree upon honorable
conditions toward international accord.”195

Eisenhower, historian Geoffrey Perret writes, realized that “this was … a
perfectly infeasible plan.”196 This would be the final moment that General MacArthur
would be sought for his strategic assessment and advice on a geopolitical issue. He would
never again in his lifetime be sought out for such strategic advice. Washington remained
committed to NSC-68, and on July 27, 1953 the Korean Armistice Agreement was
signed. This armistice cemented what MacArthur believed to be one of the largest
political blunders which would have an effect upon the security of the entire Far East for
decades to come.197
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The last documented strategic plan outlined by MacArthur came in 1954. This
plan was presented during an interview conducted by Bob Considine of the Hearst Press
on January 27, 1954. Just after MacArthur’s death in 1964, the New York Times
published this Hearst Press interview. This interview was one of the last in which the
retired General expressed his opinion on what the end of war solution could have been.
The strategy laid out in the interview was a more detailed version of the one he provided
Eisenhower. MacArthur’s strategy began with the neutralizing the foe’s air force: “The
enemy’s air (power) would first have been taken out,” he began. “I would have dropped
between 30 to 50 atomic bombs on his air bases and other depots strung across the neck
of Manchuria from just across the Yalu River from Antung (northwestern tip of Korea) to
the neighborhood of Hunchun (just north of the north-eastern tip of Korea near the border
of the U.S.S.R.).” This mission “under the cover of darkness,” he explained, “would have
destroyed the enemy’s air force on the ground, wiped out his maintenance and his
airmen.” The logistical problem of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, MacArthur pointed out,
would then prohibit a swift resupply and rebuild. The next phase of the war would be
fought on the ground by way of two amphibious landing forces. The first would be made
up of 500,000 Chinese Nationalist troops and one Marine division “would have landed at
Antung and proceeded eastward along the road that parallels the Yalu.” The second
landing force, comprised of the other Marine division, “would have landed
simultaneously at Unggi or Najin, hit the same river road, and charged very quickly
westward. Forces could have joined in two days, forming a wall of manpower and firepower across the northern border of Korea.” The defeat for the enemies’ superior
numbers would happen as a result of starvation, “he would have sued for peace
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immediately after learning his air had been taken out” and his supply lines had been
cut.198

The most telling portion of the interview came when discussing the threat of the
Soviet Union. The significance of this interview can be found in its embittered language.
Wittner asked MacArthur what he would have done had the Soviet Union intervened.
MacArthur responded, “Russia? It makes me laugh when I recall the fears of the TrumanAcheson-Marshall-Bradley-general staff group that Russia would commit its armies to a
war in China’s behalf at the end of an endless one-track railroad to peninsular
battleground that led only to the sea.” He continued, “Russia could not have engaged us.
She would not have fought for China. She is already unhappy and uncertain over the
colossus she had encouraged. The truce we entered into—that stupendous blunder of
refusing to win when we could have won—has given China the breathing time she
needed.” She had been allowed to update her “primitive airfields in Manchuria”
transforming them into “modern installations with 10,000 foot runways.” As for her war
making capabilities, she has expanded her limited “concentrated arms-producing area”
from one to four. MacArthur went even further stating that “in 50 years, if she can
develop her plane-building facilities, China will be one of the world’s top military
powers.” Embittered [angrily], MacArthur declared “it was in our power to destroy the
Red Chinese army and Chinese military power. And probably for all time. My plan was a
cinch. I was refused the right to carry it out by a group of isolationists and the politically
minded joint chiefs.”199
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Finally to Wittner, MacArthur condemned the policies and political positioning
the decision makers during the Korean War period. “They were the true isolationists.
They made only one revision in what we came to know as isolationism in this country.
They expanded their walls to include Western Europe. They never understood the world
as a whole. They never understood the enormous forces of Asia.” Eisenhower maintained
this isolationism. MacArthur concluded that all his decades spent serving and fighting in
the Pacific were all for naught, “in time, we will scuttle our holdings and interests in the
Pacific.”200

While the strategies of MacArthur were given little credence in the present limited
war scenario of the Korea War, his strategy made sense given his assessment of SinoSoviet capabilities and the Soviet Union’s aversion to risk. The Soviet Union had sought
expansion through political infiltration and then civil war. At no point was the Soviet
Union redistributing large amounts of military troops and resources to the Far East. It had
become evident in the course of the Korean War that the Soviet Union could not be
enticed to enter into that war. Therefore, it was logical to assess that the Soviet Union’s
decision engage in warfare would be based upon an assessment of their own capabilities.
Instead the Soviet Union used China as their proxy to assist the North Korean’s. The use
of the PRC, a nation in its infancy with no modern military capabilities, was proof that
while the Soviet Union desire solidification of its eastern front, she was not going to risk
its new growing status as a world power to achieve it. The Soviet Union was not fighting
its own wars, she sought others to do this for her. The opportunity had presented itself to
the United Nations and the United States to damage the reputation of the Soviet Union in
the Far East, roll back communism in Korea and China, and prevent the Soviet Union
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from solidifying its current foot hold in the Far East. Collectively, this would have
substantially weakened the Soviet position in Europe.

The four point plan provided to the JCS outlined a method by which this could be
achieved. In MacArthur’s mind the sooner the Truman Administration and UN officials
realized this new state of war and what it meant, the sooner European peace could be
solidified. He insisted that, without greatly weakening the western flank of men, he could
completely destroy Communist China’s military capability which included the possibility
of complete reversal of the Chinese Civil War. This was the final element in the fourth
point of his plan. The release and implementation of Chaing Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces
in Formosa upon the Chinese mainland and in Korea. The effect of this strategy would
have been two fold. First, MacArthur would have had access to the reinforcements that he
needed, without draining human resources from Europe. Second, Washington would have
had the opportunity to reverse their blunder in the Chinese Civil War. The reversal of the
Chinese Civil War would be possible for two reasons; the inherent civil distrust that
which is the oppressive nature of communism and the overstretched CCF. The Chinese
Communists had committed most all of its strength stationed in Manchuria and
committed to the Korean War. Stretched to this magnitude and fully engaged in warfare
on the Korean front the initiation of a second front in southern China was attractive to
MacArthur. While the CCF had surprised MacArthur in their tactical abilities and had
seen some amount of initial success, a two front conflict would result in the imminent
collapse on both their fronts. Throughout Korea and Manchuria, the CCF would be
heavily bombarded – their resources and infrastructure would be destroyed. They would
be pinned down unable to swiftly move soldiers and supplies from the north back to the
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south. Further yet, a decision to retreat to focus on combating the Kuomintang in
southern China would risk exposing their north flank and industries even further. They
would be paralyzed and their defeat would be all but guaranteed.

To MacArthur, this entire strategy would severely obstruct the continued attempts
by the Soviet Union to modernize its military. They would again be denied warm water
access, their naval development again set back decades, so too would their access to
natural resources and raw materials be hindered. The execution of this strategic plan
would have resulted in the expansion of the Pacific defensive perimeter, allowing the
development and the permanent establishment of governments with the complete
capability to fend off the spread of communism.

The Truman Administration and JCS, however, did not share MacArthur’s
strategic views. They remained focused solely upon Germany and Japan. To them
Germany was in a more precarious and vulnerable position due to the proximity of the
strength of the Soviet military and its current possession of German land. The possible
threat of the Soviet Union’s potential capabilities was a major factor in their refusal to
permit MacArthur the proper men and equipment to conduct military action in Korea.

For General MacArthur the time was now to deliver a decisive blow to the desires
of these communist nations establishing themselves as a world power. It was understood
that at the moment the Chinese and Russian relationship was one of convenience and at
the moment would never expand to full military support for one another – due to Russia’s
vulnerability. However, if China was allowed to grow and they were allowed to firmly
establish themselves upon the coastal waters of Asia, it would foster the growth of a
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powerful ally in Soviet Russia which would then shift the “balance of military power in
the struggle for the world.”201

In MacArthur’s mind, UN forces held ground and air superiority and thus could
only be defeated by its own politics. While the western leaders were obsessed with the
fear of Soviet Russia’s perceived desire in Europe, they were blinded by propaganda and
thus failed to see their glaring weakness, their southern and eastern flank. Thus, there was
never serious danger of active Soviet intervention. MacArthur advised the JCS that the
Soviet Union could not be coaxed into a war in the Far East. Furthermore, if she decided
that the moment to take military action in the Far East was at hand, MacArthur
maintained that the logistical impediments would be her ruin. Most importantly he
assessed that the chief advantage lay with America’s atomic bomb, while Soviet
manufacturing has just begun. Accepting this logic reveals that the time was right to
aggressively roll back communism absent of fear and restriction. The opportunity to
strike a crippling blow to the Soviet Union’s desire of a “Pacific Wall” and to quarantine
communism behind strong stable governments was at hand. The battlefield had been
chosen and MacArthur desired to oblige the enemy. In the eyes of MacArthur this was
the opportunity to suffocate the Cold War enemies, forever limiting their potential power.
The moment was at hand, and the evidence was there.202
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

General MacArthur’s strategy for the Korean War and the Cold War overall in
1950 was marked with aggression. Combine fervent militancy with a resolute mindset
that victory was the only option and one might begin to comprehend MacArthur’s
strategy. He advocated that “we defend every place, and I say that we have the capacity
to do it. If you say that we haven’t, you admit defeat. If the enemy has that capacity and
is divided on all these fronts, we should be able to meet it.”203 It was for this reason that
General MacArthur so ferociously supported Formosa and the unification of Korea –
meeting force with equal counter force in Korea. MacArthur’s letter to Congressman Joe
Martin, dated March 20, 1951, clearly explains what was at stake in Asia: “It seems
strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communists
conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined
the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe’s war with arms while
the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to Communism in
Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable; win it and Europe most probably would avoid war
and yet preserve freedom. As you point out, we must win. There is no substitute for
victory.”204

Segments of MacArthur’s memoir illustrate the imperativeness with which he
regarded victory over maintaining the status quo in Korea: “Its disastrous consequences
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were reflected throughout Asia. Red China promptly was accepted as the military
colossus of the East. Korea was left ravished and divided. Indochina was partitioned by
the sword. Tibet was taken almost on demand. Other Asian nations began to tremble
toward neutralism. It confirmed Red control of continental China, and fostered the
growth of a powerful ally of Soviet Russia which well might become a balance of
military power in the struggle for the world.”205 The situation in Korea was a microcosm
of the entire Cold War; victory in Korea would mean a victory over the Soviet Union and
global preponderance. The Korea War offered the opportunity to destroy emerging
totalitarian regimes preventing them from achieving and then challenging the global
preponderance of the United States.

This was evident in the proposed strategies by MacArthur. At bottom, he was
willing to risk general war with the Soviet Union and the PRC to achieve a complete
victory in Korea. He accepted this risk because he thought the gains from victory would
be great while the chances of general war actually breaking out were relatively low. This
assessment was based on his view of the significance of Asia in the global balance of
power, the military superiority of the United States, and the Soviet’s unwillingness to
take big risks in their confrontation with the United States. Even if general war did break
out as a consequence of pursuing victory in Korea, moreover, MacArthur was confident
the United States would win it. Now, then, was not the time to be cautious. Now was the
time to go for victory.

Nuclear weapons and (especially), the nuclear balance had much to do with
MacArthur’s strategy. He saw this weaponry as usable, a necessary part of the new
80

method of warfare in which the implementation of this decisive weapon could achieve
victories in war. Evidence of this weapon’s capability to gain victory was already
demonstrated in the summer of 1945 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The United States had
used its navy, air force, and ground troops to “rollback” the Japanese in the Pacific.
Authorization of the use of the atomic bomb against Japan was designed to expedite the
forgone conclusion of Japan’s defeat. The success of the atomic bomb in 1945 and the
United States numerical monopoly during the Korean War led MacArthur to believe that
atomic weaponry should be made available for use in modern warfare when called upon.
This understanding of this made him more apt to deploy atomic weaponry on the field of
battle. This is evident in his strategic bombing plans that included the creation of a
“radioactive belt” along the Yalu in order to allow United Nations ground forces to defeat
the Sino-Korean armies and unify Korea. He viewed the usage of atomic weaponry as
predicated upon the basic needs of combat. The point of developing such military
weapons is their strategic implementation in wartime practices.

MacArthur’s entire discussion on the decisiveness that nuclear weapons offered a
modern military and his stress on what he saw as an overwhelming United States
advantage in nuclear weaponry in 1950-1951, implied, though, that he may have doubted
their useability in the context of United States – Soviet Union parity in which the Soviet
Union could retaliate against the United States after absorbing a United States first strike.
Therefore, if the United States sought an aggressive strategy against the Soviet Union the
Korean War offered the opportunity. MacArthur’s assessment of the Soviet Union’s Air
Force capabilities implies that he did not believe that the Soviet Union was capable of
launching bombing missions against the mainland of the United States. This assessment
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suggests that MacArthur’s belief in the usability of nuclear weapons in Korea was based
upon his cost benefit analysis which suggested that the only retaliation the Soviet Union
could take would be against the United States forces positioned in Germany or in Japan.
The latter of which would be restricted to an aerial campaign because the Soviet Union
lacked the capability to mount an invasion of Japan. In the West – where the United
States stationed the majority of its foreign based military – MacArthur believed that
United Nations’ forces would be capable of absorbing any immediate counter operations
by the Soviet Union and be able to launch a strategic campaign which could halt and
dissuade the Soviet Union from ever conducting future military operations. Collectively,
this would result in a severe “rollback” of the Soviet Union. However, timing was
everything in MacArthur’s strategic assessments. MacArthur believed that any delaying
of the aggressive “rollback” of the Soviet Union would only permit the Soviet Union time
to build its stock-pile of nuclear weaponry, which would result in making these weapons
eventually unusable when – according to the timeline of NSC-68 – the United States was
ready.

The Soviet Union’s successful acquisition of atomic capabilities, coupled with
their aggressive expansion and success in the Far East, had MacArthur on the defensive.
While he did not believe that the Soviet Union’s capabilities were comparable with the
United States, this new acquisition had them moving swiftly in that direction. This meant
that the Soviet Union’s atomic achievement destabilized the United States – Soviet
relationship. Soon the Soviet Union would not be using its allies to achieve her desired
goals, but her own military. It was for that reason that MacArthur argued the imperative
nature of winning the Korean War in the larger Cold War context. The Soviet Union had
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to be controlled before she completely modernized her militarily. Passively permitting the
Soviet Union to surpass the United States’ nuclear preponderance would destroy the
United States’ containment capabilities in both Europe and Asia with threats of general
war and the use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union being suicidal. MacArthur’s
“obsession” with seizing the opportunity in Korea against the Soviet Union and the PRC
was to avoid facing this dilemma.

From that perspective, MacArthur was not very different from members of the
JCS, State Department, or the Truman Administration. The whole premise of NSC-68
was to regain a decisive first-strike advantage against the Soviet Union. At the very least
NSC-68 was to reinforce the credibility of containment – but ideally to go beyond
containment and “rollback” Communism. MacArthur agreed with the notion outlined in
NSC-68 that the Soviet Union “could be a victim of its own dynamism: if its forward
thrusts were frustrated, and the Soviets had to deal with a superior counterpressure, the
seeds of decay within the Soviet system would begin to flourish and fructify.”206 This
concept was the same used by MacArthur in his assessment of the weakness of the PRC.
The Korean War provided the opportunity to fulfill what NSC-68 designed to
accomplish. While MacArthur too saw that a military buildup was needed for the Soviet
Union would be all the more powerful when it developed the hydrogen bomb, he argued
that the United States – at that moment in time – still maintained military preponderance.
This was the main difference between the Truman and MacArthur. Each perceived
differently the moment when the “window of vulnerability” was upon the United States.
MacArthur believed that the longer they waited the less desirable outcome of a general
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war with the Soviet Union would be and the more vulnerable their geopolitical
preponderance would be.

In the 1950s no one was comfortable with the prospect of what would eventually
become known as a situation of mutual deterrence based upon mutual assured destruction
(MAD). Leaders throughout Washington D.C. knew that such a situation must be avoided
at almost any cost, for it would lock in the status quo and only exacerbate an already
unstable situation. Eisenhower stated this in 1953 during his State of the Union address:
“[The] free world cannot indefinitely remain in a posture of paralyzed tension.”207 There
is no doubt that General MacArthur too shared these beliefs. The key difference was that
MacArthur was simply more of a risk-taker in this regard than the other leadership
throughout Washington D.C.
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